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Executive summary 
This report focuses on the specific challenges and opportunities of states that are making 
two challenging concurrent transitions, away from both extreme poverty and from conflict. 
First, they are ‘countries where the longer term prospects of the poor to escape poverty are 
overall good, but not necessarily secure or sustainable, and at risk of development reversals’ 
(Dercon and Lea, 2014). Second, they are affected in various ways by conflict and instability 
and are addressing the challenges of maintaining peace. This report is based on studies in 
six such countries with the aim of providing evidence, conclusions, and recommendations on 
the developing of private sector development (PSD) strategies in such places. The countries 
studied are Egypt, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Nepal, Myanmar, and Sudan. The report builds on 
previous research, including an earlier study under the UK Department for International 
Development’s (DFID) Policy Research Fund looking at the challenges of PSD in lower-
middle-income countries (Davis., 2016). 
The regional setting for these countries has significant implications both in terms of 
economic development and conflict. Conflicts in a country’s neighbours will mean that 
previously prosperous trading partners disappear and also that trade routes to the wider 
region are disrupted. Conflict in a country’s ‘neighbourhood’ may also have serious 
spillovers, for example in creating large numbers of refugees, which in turn have a 
destabilising effect domestically. Furthermore, fear that regional instability could affect 
national stability has significant impacts on domestic politics and the decisions that are 
made. 
At a domestic level, these transition countries face serious challenges. Most obviously they 
are typically run by oligarchic elites that operate more for their own benefit than for that of 
the country as a whole. Much political energy goes into managing the interests of these 
elites rather than into focusing on and addressing the country’s development challenges. 
This challenge of political focus is aggravated by often-challenging administrative and legal 
processes. Public officials are frequently appointed on the basis of connections rather than 
qualifications, meaning that, even when reforms are attempted, the capacity to see them 
through is often lacking.  
These national-level challenges spill over into the private sector, restricting its capability to 
grow effectively and to create jobs and income. A core challenge is that elite control at a 
political level also exists in the private sector, with the result that key sectors and important 
companies are controlled by politicians, the military, or others connected to the ruling 
regime. This has a number of effects. First, these companies frequently fail to deliver often-
important services to the wider economy and stymie reform. Second, it means that large 
parts of the private sector may be operating in an opaque manner. Third, there is often a fear 
in the wider private sector that if they grow too big, or identify an interesting new commercial 
opportunity, this will be snatched up by elites. Companies also face significant challenges 
with the regulatory environment, with laws which are either highly problematic or not properly 
enforced. The private sector is also typified in these countries by a ‘missing middle’. There is 
a lack of medium-sized companies to link small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to 
opportunities with larger firms. Regional inequities can mean that commercial activities take 
place predominantly in a small number of large commercial hubs, with little going on in 
neglected, often rural, settings. 
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It is clear that, for PSD practitioners, the usual toolbox of solutions is not sufficient to meet 
the challenges that exist. These include firstly a focus on macroeconomic stability, which 
though technically not part of a PSD portfolio is necessary to provide support to countries 
responding to significant instability. Reform of the regulatory environment is a key challenge 
in these countries, but making change happen is complicated by elite control and poor 
implementation capacities on the part of public servants. As a result, much PSD effort goes 
on firm-level activities, to support companies to survive and expand even in a problematic 
wider context. It is also clear that in these contexts, PSD programming needs to be very 
closely tied to other streams of development activity, in particular interventions on issues of 
governance and peacebuilding. However, factors such as education and infrastructure are 
also important to the longer-term development of the private sector, and therefore PSD 
needs to link closely to activities in these areas too. Programming needs to be flexible and 
adaptive and responsive to change as it happens, as well as needing to pick up and exploit 
opportunities as they arise. The combination of conflict and middle-income challenges often 
make the reform agenda seem huge and undoable. By focusing on what might be relatively 
small areas of reform, practitioners are in a better position to make change happen.  
In fragile contexts, the private sector is inextricably interwoven into the conflict dynamics. 
PSD practitioners need to maintain clear sight of the these dynamics in the places where 
they operate, while those working on other areas of development also need to understand 
the private sector and see PSD activities as a priority. Economic activity will not solve 
conflict, but nor can PSD and broader economic growth wait until conflict is resolved. PSD 
activities in middle-income countries need to focus on several different aspects of ‘the 
private sector’ – ranging from large international investors and diaspora businesses to 
smaller SMEs. Each will have a different role to play, and different interests: all need to be 
accommodated. Practitioners need to be pragmatic in their approach, and base what they do 
on detailed and ongoing conflict and political economy analysis. These are crucial to 
ensuring that interventions are focused on the right issues, and to identify where leverage for 
change might exist even in a generally challenging context.  
This study shares many of the conclusions of the 2016 study looking at lower-middle-income 
countries. These include: challenges with elite control and the impact this has on the growth 
of the private sector; a poor and opaque regulatory environment; and the need to see PSD 
programming as part of an overall approach in a country, in particular with interventions 
focused on good governance. However, this study has also identified significant additional 
issues stemming from the addition of conflict dynamics. First, the regional context in which a 
country exists is extremely important, meaning programming needs to consider the regional 
as well as the national context. Second, the implications of conflict may lie as much in the 
fear of instability as much as in the reality of it. Third, and most importantly, the conflict 
dimension means that the stakes are much higher. The skein of interests and networks that 
prevents a fragile situation getting worse is complex and often opaque. Development 
programming needs to be very sensitive and undertake detailed and appropriate analysis to 
ensure that interventions improve the situation or at the very least do not destabilise the 
status quo.  
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1 Introduction 
The international development community is seeking ways to address two particular 
challenges: how to support development in middle- and lower-middle-income countries, and 
how to deal with fragile and conflict-affected states. This report presents the findings from a 
research project that studied countries which fall into both of these categories, i.e. which are 
both middle- and lower-middle-income and fragile. The research was undertaken between 
November 2017 and June 2018 and was supported by the DFID Policy Research Fund. It 
was primarily qualitative in nature and builds on a previous research project supported by 
DFID (Davis et al., 2016) looking at the challenges facing PSD practitioners in lower-middle-
income countries progressing to prosperity. This research project incorporated both desk-
based research and in-country case studies of six locations: Ethiopia, Egypt, Lebanon, 
Myanmar, Nepal, and Sudan. The objective of this research, as defined by its terms of 
reference was ‘to provide evidence, conclusions and recommendations which will guide 
DFID and other donor organisations in developing PSD strategies for countries progressing 
towards peace and prosperity’.  
The increased focus on the part of the development community on middle-income countries 
reflects the fact that as many as two-thirds of the world’s poor now live in these countries. 
Yet these places exhibit a very particular set of development challenges and many become 
stuck in the ‘middle-income trap’, i.e. they find it hard to progress from middle-income to 
high-income status. Fragile and conflict-affected states also present very particular 
challenges. They are significant both in their own right – it is estimated that one in five of the 
world’s population live in countries that are fragile or conflict-affected – but also because of 
the wider impacts of fragility: as many as 90% of refugees are displaced because of conflict 
and instability. 
This study consisted of two phases: an initial review of existing literature and then a series of 
field research trips in each of our focal countries. The review of secondary literature covered 
two topic areas: first, the literature relating to the role of the private sector in fragile states 
and the perceived role of PSD in this; and, second, that relating to the challenges faced by 
middle-income countries, in particular focusing on the ‘middle-income trap’ and the causes of 
it. The literature on the private sector in fragile states remains relatively slight, with fewer 
novel additions to the corpus of knowledge than might be expected for such a significant and 
important topic. With a few notable exceptions – for example, a study by GIZ (Schrade et al., 
2016) of the role of PSD and the private sector in active conflict – much of the recent 
literature merely reviews previous studies rather than explores new ground. By contrast, the 
literature on the challenges facing middle-income countries is larger and there have been 
more recent, substantive contributions to the debate. 
Selecting case study countries for this study proved complicated. In the first instance was 
the usual challenge of case study research that no set of cases can ever be representative 
of all countries in transition and therefore criticism could be made of any country case 
choices made. However, in the case of this research, a particular challenge was posed by 
the question of exactly what is meant by a ‘fragile and conflict-affected state’ (FCS).1 Some 
countries are obvious – Afghanistan, for example – but lists compiled by international 
agencies differ. The World Bank list for example is quite binary, with countries being labelled 
as FCS if they fall below a certain score on the Bank’s country assessment. DFID’s 
categorisation is more nuanced and lists countries by level of fragility, also including 
                                               
1 This issue is explored in greater detail in the next chapter 
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countries that neighbour fragile states. It was eventually from this list that country cases 
were selected, focusing on those countries that are listed as either ‘medium’ or ‘high’ 
fragility. From within this list, the following criteria were used to identify case studies: 
 Research risks: The team collectively agreed that we would avoid field visits to 
countries in which active conflict would pose a risk to researchers.  
 Proximity to conflict: While countries with widespread hot conflict were to be avoided it 
was important to survey countries that are not too far past conflict.  
 Causes of conflict: Azar’s (1990) ‘levels of analysis’ approach argues that conflict 
causation can be seen as having international, national, sub-national, and local 
causations. So far as possible, this study encompassed conflicts that include different 
levels of causation.  
 Stage of transition: As in the previous study (Davis 2016), it was important to 
understand where countries are on their journey to and beyond middle-income status.  
 Different geographies: The case studies needed to be drawn from different 
geographies rather than being all from one continent.  
 Regional considerations: Both the FCS and middle-income countries literature make 
clear that international links are important. It was important therefore to explore in the 
field visits the degree to which regional factors were important for countries’ economic 
and stability trajectories.  
 Availability of data: There is little point in doing a case study if there is little or no 
information readily available. It was important therefore to choose countries to study 
where data of a decent standard were available.  
This set of criteria eventually led the research team to identify six target countries, drawn 
from three regions, as follows:  
 Asia: Myanmar, Nepal 
 Horn of Africa: Ethiopia, Sudan 
 Middle East: Egypt, Lebanon 
Country research trips took place in spring 2018 and consisted of interviews with key people 
and organisations in the subject countries. Key stakeholders to engage with were identified 
before the country mission, with the considerable and welcome support of British embassies 
and high commissions. These were supplemented by use of the co-called ‘snowball 
sampling’ approach, with initial interviewees being asked to recommend others to speak 
with. To reduce the risk of bias, the team needed to ensure that our interview process 
reached as broad a cross-section of relevant stakeholders as possible. Typically, 
interviewees included the following: 
 DFID country office, including previous heads of office and advisers as appropriate; 
 Other representatives of the UK government, for example Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office staff; 
 Other bilateral development agencies and missions; 
 The International Finance Corporation (IFC) and other relevant development banks; 
 Representatives of the private sector, including foreign investors, local firms, SMEs, etc.; 
 Business membership organisations; and 
 Academics and commentators. 
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The findings of this study were, understandably, multifaceted and complex. To provide a 
coherent narrative, the research team used the following organising structure to organise the 
data on each country, and for the study overall: 
 Regional context: What regional issues are relevant to, and impact on, the target 
country? This will include both issues relating to conflicts and inter-regional trade and 
investment.  
 Country context: What stages are there for countries in their graduation from 
development aid, and can key ‘markers’ be identified which allow a judgement to be 
made on where a country is in this journey? 
 Private sector: What sort of private sector is most desirable in developmental terms? 
Which contributes best to its host country’s progression? What challenges exist to the 
creation and durability of a private sector that contributes to wider development?  
 PSD: Tasks and roles: What PSD modalities work best at different times to create 
stable states and a developmentally positive private sector? Which of the expanding 
range of partners are most relevant to deliver which interventions? 
Figure 1: Mapping the role of PSD in countries moving toward peace and prosperity 
 
 
 
Chapters 3–6 will therefore investigate each of these ‘rings’ in detail. Each of these analytical 
chapters, based substantially on the evidence generated by our country case studies, seeks 
both to assess the issues that have emerged and to make action-oriented recommendations 
that will be useful to development practitioners. The final chapter of this report then draws 
together overarching themes and conclusions from the research as a whole. 
It is important to also note what this report does not do, and the limitations of its scope. First, 
and most obviously, as is inevitable with a study based on case studies, what has emerged 
from the six countries studied may not necessarily hold true for other locations. Second, 
while this report focuses on lower-middle and middle-income countries and what makes 
them distinctive, we did not conduct a comparative survey with countries at other stages of 
development. Finally, it is important to note that this report, though funded by DFID, is 
intended as a contribution to the development debate as a whole. It is anticipated that its 
findings (and indeed the questions arising from those) will be useful not just to ‘traditional’ 
donors but also to the numerous other actors now in the development space. 
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2 Research and policy context 
This research focuses on two key issues: the role of the private sector in fragile states, and 
the challenges countries face in moving into, and beyond, lower-middle-income status. This 
chapter explores the relevant secondary literature and the policy context for both of these 
issues. Specifically, the aim of this study is to provide evidence, conclusions, and 
recommendations on the development of PSD strategies in such places.  
Increasingly, a key focus of the international development community is on FCS. As was 
pointed out in a recent GIZ study (Schrade et al, 2017), about 1.4 billion people – around 
20% of the world’s population – currently live in countries in, or prone to, conflict. Moreover, 
90% of the more than 60 million refugees worldwide (including internally displaced persons) 
are fleeing from violent conflict and human rights violations. Thus, many contexts of 
development cooperation are affected by conflict, violence, and fragility, and accordingly 
approaches to development cooperation need to consider these circumstances. 
At the same time, the international development community is shifting away from its historic 
focus on the world’s poorest countries. It is now clear that if donors wish to reach poor 
people, then they need to focus increasingly on vulnerable countries where poor people live. 
In 1990, less than 10% of the world’s poor lived in middle-income countries; by 2007 this 
figure had increased to over 70%. This change is in particular due to the move from low- to 
middle-income status of five countries: China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Pakistan.  
2.1 FCS 
Poverty is becoming increasingly concentrated in fragile states. It is estimated that half of the 
world’s people surviving on less than $1.25 a day are found in fragile states. People in fragile 
states are more than twice as likely to be undernourished as those in other developing 
countries, more than three times as likely to be unable to send their children to school, and 
twice as likely to see their children die before the age of five. In 2013, the World Bank 
reported that fragile states ‘continue to lag behind the rest of the developing world in meeting 
development goals’ (World Bank, 2013). 
The donor community has therefore been increasingly focusing on these states from a 
development perspective, not simply looking at what can be done in peacekeeping and 
humanitarian terms. The UK government has been at the forefront of these developments, 
and has a clear focus: ‘Work to prevent and respond to conflict and fragility saves lives and 
reduces human suffering is essential for poverty reduction and progress against the SDGs 
[Sustainable Development Goals] and it can help to address threats to global and regional 
stability’ (International Development Committee, 2012). Other donors too are focusing their 
work: at the 2011 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the major bilateral and 
multilateral donors committed to the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.  
2.1.1 What are FCS? 
Despite the development community’s increased focus on FCS, the definition of exactly what 
fragility is remains a matter of debate. As World Bank (2018b:) observed, since a list of FCS 
as states was first developed, it has ‘gone through a series of changes in terms of 
classification. The concept and the list have evolved as the WBG’s [World Bank Group’s] 
understanding of the development challenges in countries affected by violence and instability 
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has matured.’ This also remains a work in progress: a report from the World Bank’s 
Independent Evaluation Group (2013) observed the need for the Bank to ‘[develop] a more 
suitable and accurate mechanism to classify FCS’. 
Terms such as ‘conflict-affected’ and ‘post-conflict’, while widely used, can be unhelpful 
given how dynamic are the factors leading to war and instability. As World Bank (2004:8) 
concluded, ‘post-conflict countries face a 44% chance of reverting to conflict during the first 
five years following the onset of peace’. The Swedish development agency, Sida, uses what 
it terms an ‘integrated conflict perspective’ to reflect the challenge that conflict and tensions 
alter over time (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Sida’s integrated conflict cycle 
 
Source: Sida (2017) 
However, fragility and instability are about more than conflict alone. As the recent report by 
the Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development2 observed, there are a range of 
‘characteristics of fragility, including the lack of basic security, inadequate government 
capacity, the absence of a properly functioning private sector, and the presence of divided 
societies’ (Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018: 12). Moreover, 
conflict and/or instability may be geographically limited in any given country. This is true of a 
number of the countries included in this study: in Myanmar, although major conflict exists in 
Rakhine, and instability is present in a number of other areas, much of the centre of the 
country is stable. A similar situation of a stable centre and fragile regions is also true of 
Ethiopia. In Egypt, the Da’esh insurgency affects the Sinai Peninsula but rarely impacts on 
the country as a whole.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that as some countries become stuck in a middle-income trap, 
others (sometimes the same ones) are stuck in a ‘conflict trap’. As the Cameron Commission 
says, ‘fragile societies are typically trapped in a syndrome of interlocking characteristics 
which makes it hard to make sustained progress’ (Commission on State Fragility, Growth 
and Development, 2018: 16). The Commission identifies a number of factors leading to this 
‘fragility syndrome’. First, such states are often fractured into groups with opposing identities 
who see their struggles as a zero-sum game. Second, because of the oppositional approach 
that results, many citizens do not regard the state as legitimate and so do not comply with it. 
Third, compounding this, the state lacks the capacity to perform basic functions, such as 
service delivery, citizen security, taxation, and infrastructure. Fourth, identity politics and lack 
                                               
2 This is sometimes referred to as the Cameron Commission after one of its co-chairs, former UK Prime Minister, 
David Cameron.  
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of state capacity mean that a country has inadequate security, which is manifested in 
sporadic outbreaks of violence. All four of these problems then compound a fifth: the private 
sector is underdeveloped so that incomes are low and the economy narrowly based.  
2.1.2 The private sector in FCS 
A key recommendation of the Cameron Commission is to facilitate and stimulate the private 
sector, on the basis that ‘if the economy grows and drives up living standards, people 
acquire a greater stake in their society, and state revenues, capacities, and legitimacy all 
increase’ (Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018: 20). This 
conclusion coheres with the wider and growing recognition of the importance of the private 
sector in FCS. A failure to do so risks undermining a country’s longer-term stability. As a 
background paper to the 2011 World Development Report argued, ‘it is important to move 
away from any argument under which sequencing would imply that security comes first, 
while private sector development-related reforms come later’ (Peschka, 2011: 41). 
Therefore, as was argued in the 2011 World Development Report itself, ‘we need to put 
greater emphasis on early projects to create jobs, especially through the private sector’ 
(World Bank, 2011:xiii).  
According to the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (2010), the private sector 
can contribute to FCS in four key ways:  
 Supporting the creation of stability and trust: by supporting business across ethnic 
and other conflict divides, companies can help to foster trust and stability in the societies 
in which they operate; 
 Fostering good governance: by ensuring that they are themselves well run, companies 
can underpin the need for good governance in FCS; 
 Developing infrastructure: companies help to support the creation of both hard 
infrastructure (i.e. roads, etc.) and ‘soft’ infrastructure such as business networks and 
training provision; and 
 Creating economic growth: the private sector is crucial to the development of a strong 
economy and economic growth, which provides income to individuals and drives tax 
revenues for host countries. 
However, the private sector can also harm conflict dynamics. Keen (2009) explores the 
factors that may incline companies to be more or less prepared to engage in peacebuilding. 
He finds that enterprises engaged in low-technology, high-value commodities are indifferent 
to peace, provided these commodities remain extractable during conflict. Keen further finds 
that a minority of businesses – most of them either with access to means of violence or 
some other direct stake in the outcome of the power struggle that drives the war in question 
– are more profitable during conflict. Therefore, they may have an interest in preventing the 
re-establishment of peace: these are businesses, for example, that make higher profits from 
opportunities in food trading at times of artificially high food prices, arms trading, drug 
trading, and natural resource exploitation. By contrast, Keen finds that businesses affected 
by reduced production and weakened local demand during war – mostly in the industrial and 
agricultural production and services sectors – have the strongest interest in peace.  
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2.1.3 Different elements of the private sector: different impacts 
The ‘private sector’ is not a single entity but is rather made up of a wide range of very 
different entities, each of which interact very differently with a conflict context. As Brück et al. 
(2012:4) put it, ‘the impacts of conflict are geographically varied and the impact of violent 
conflict on entrepreneurs and firms will differ across a country or region’. A number of 
different aspects of the private sector are explored in the literature.  
Foreign investors  
Historically, views have been mixed regarding the impacts that international companies have 
on conflict dynamics. Wenger and Moeckli (2003:5), for example, argue that ‘corporations 
have long been accused of causing or exacerbating conflict through their business 
operations’. Nevertheless, some studies demonstrate that foreign direct investment (FDI) 
can have positive, beneficial impacts on conflict dynamics. Lee and Mitchell (2012:675) 
conclude that ‘higher bilateral FDI flows between two disputants significantly reduce the 
chances for escalation to high levels of violence over issues and improve the chances for 
peaceful management’. 
It is often the extractive sector that finds itself in the spotlight in FCS. However, in Bray’s 
(2005:vi) view, larger companies are likely to be unwilling to enter conflict or post-conflict 
environments because ‘in the year or two after the conflict ends, it is rarely worth taking high 
risks for returns which are, on the scale of these companies balance sheets, likely to be 
marginal’. However, by contrast, the so-called ‘mining juniors’ – smaller firms that market 
themselves to investors on the promise of high returns – are likely to enter post-conflict 
markets. These companies’ risk management processes may not always be as attuned as 
those of their bigger cousins to limiting their impact on conflict dynamics.  
Beyond the extractive sectors, it is frequently those companies in the agribusiness, food and 
beverage value chains that operate in FCS. According to World Bank (2014), Coca-Cola is 
one of the 10 companies with the most investments in fragile and conflict-affected situations 
and offers a number of well-documented examples of development multipliers. Other 
multinationals such as Nestle, Unilever, PepsiCo, Wal-Mart, Olam, Danone, and DSM are 
also investing in projects in FCS. 
The telecommunications sector is one of the few in the non-extractive sectors to attract 
sizeable and early investment and to demonstrate high rates of growth in FCS. As Bray 
(2005:41) points out, ‘mobile phone companies have shown themselves willing to move into 
post-conflict economies as soon as the fighting ceases’. As a result, rapid increases in 
access to telephony were recorded even in countries with very difficult business 
environments or with ongoing conflict and a high incidence of poverty. For example, 38% of 
Afghanis and 34% of Sierra Leoneans had a mobile phone subscription in 2010, up from 4% 
and 14%, respectively, in 2005. The growth of mobile networks was largely driven by private 
investment, and accessibility increased due to competition.  
Banks differ from other sectors in that their exposure is indirect rather than direct. A bank’s 
own footprint in a fragile state may be confined to a small office. However, the exposure lies 
in funding other companies and projects that are themselves vulnerable to the impacts of 
conflict. Moreover, the often-problematic legal framework in these countries poses 
challenges in terms of security of collateral, as well as in terms of the processes of banking 
oversight and regulation.  
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Regional multinationals 
There are a range of companies that are not known internationally but that invest in 
countries in their ‘back yard’. This category includes, for example, companies from Beirut 
investing in other countries in the Middle East and companies from Morocco and Nigeria 
expanding into other places in west Africa. The reason for this careful expansion is that 
these companies believe they have sufficient affinity with their target markets because of 
their similarity with their home market. By contrast with global multinationals, these 
companies may not have as wide a choice of investment markets; nonetheless, they have 
some flexibility and can scale up or scale down their activities in a range of countries 
depending on particular circumstances. They, too, may have options to leverage assets in 
stable countries to facilitate business in fragile states. For example, a bank may use 
collateral in western Europe or one of the Gulf States to secure a loan in somewhere like 
Iraq.  
Local companies 
Avis (2016:5) argues that ‘the local private sector is considered to have a range of 
motivations for wanting to address fragility and conflict’ because, unlike international 
companies, they have no alternative but to operate in the conflict-affected state and so suffer 
most from its impacts. He cites a number of advantages in engaging local private sector 
organisations. First, they tend to be more labour-intensive than large firms and maintain 
more linkages with other local enterprises; second, they operate in different locations and 
therefore provide a stimulus for regional development; third, they are easier to deal with for 
national and local governments; and fourth, as the local private sector operates less 
internationally, local organisations are more likely to invest and expand locally. 
However, it is clear that local companies are often caught up in the dynamics of a conflict, as 
demonstrated by the situation that has existed in Afghanistan. Giustozzi’s (2006) study of the 
private sector there identifies that in many cases companies turn to the local ‘mafias’ and 
warlords as a way of getting things done in a context where ‘official’ authorities are seen as 
too weak, incompetent, or corrupt to provide useful service. As a result, relationships 
between business people and mafia ‘have evolved into forces that reduce opportunities for 
longer term growth and a more rounded social role for business’ (226). 
2.1.4 The role of donor-led PSD and other programming 
Given these different motivations and impacts, how should donors react? Focusing on those 
elements of the private sector for which peace and security are commercially beneficial is 
crucial. As has been noted elsewhere, some companies benefit from conflict and thus it is 
important for PSD and other development professionals to be aware of the dynamics of the 
private sector in this regard. A key challenge is being able to attract and encourage 
companies given the significant risks involved. As Peschka (2011:8) observed, ‘in the 
absence of basic security … businesses are reluctant to make the long-term investments 
that spur economic growth and generate the jobs so desperately needed in these 
challenging contexts’. 
Regulatory reform 
At the most basic level, companies want to be sure that their investment in a country is 
secure and that, at the very least, they will be able to recoup that investment. Evidence 
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suggests that developing economies with better business regulations achieve faster annual 
economic growth rates. For example, according to Samuels (2006:12), ‘rule of law is 
essential to economic development and poor enforcement of business contracts is damaging 
for countries rebuilding from conflict’. 
Appel and Loyle (2012:689) argue also that putting in place processes of post-conflict justice 
(such as truth and reconciliation commissions) allows states to ‘send a costly and credible 
signal to international investors about the state’s willingness to pursue the successful 
reconstruction of the post-conflict zone’. In their view, establishing post-conflict justice 
structures, which is a hard thing to do, sends the message that the host government is 
serious about change and reform and as such ‘can act as a signal to reduce investor risk’.  
Blended finance as a tool to reduce risk 
The literature also explores the degree to which new ‘blended finance’ approaches to 
development might help address the issue of perceived and actual risk in FCS. Cusack and 
Tilleard (2013), for example, point to the potential for sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) to act 
as a process for providing investment and encouraging other private sector entities. The 
same point is made by Torjesen (2013), specifically in relation to the Norwegian sovereign 
wealth fund Norfund. Her analysis is that investment in post-conflict countries is often 
concentrated into a few sectors and often only appears several years after the conflict has 
come to an end. Norfund, she argues (and, by extension, other SWFs), is in a position to be 
able to provide funding more immediately after a conflict has come to an end, and to 
stimulate investment in a wider range of sectors and therefore spread risk in the economy.  
Ideally, entities such as the IFC should play a coordinating function, as in a project to 
develop local supply chains. The IFC (and indeed the World Bank and United Nations 
agencies) has political credibility and convening power, and therefore is well placed to bring 
different partners together and to find joined-up ways of dealing with at least some of the 
challenges companies face in operating in FCS. Cusack and Tilleard (2013) make a strong 
case for international development actors to facilitate private sector investment in FCS, for 
example by acting as co-financer or as a shared hub of knowledge on which a number of 
companies can draw. 
Building capacity 
The ability of governments in fragile states to operate effectively is crucial. Focusing 
specifically on the issue of natural resource management in Africa, Besada (2013:2) argues 
for the ‘critical importance of governance – the deficiency or effectiveness of public and 
private sector institutions – as the key to understanding the prevalence or absence of violent 
conflict’. He cites the example of Debswana, a joint venture between the Government of 
Botswana and the mining firm De Beers. This firm is key to the diamond sector, which 
accounts for about half the country’s tax revenues. As part of a strategy to diversify the 
economy, Debswana has also made investments in tourism, farming, and education, thereby 
using ‘diamond revenue for economic development objectives, infrastructure development 
and poverty alleviation programmes’ (Besada, 2013:39).  
Frequently, however, a challenge facing the private sector in fragile states is a lack of 
capacity in the governmental structures of those states. Whatever the regulatory framework 
may be, in many cases the structures through which those regulations are implemented lack 
capability and capacity. Civil servants are sometimes unaware of their proper role and lack 
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the necessary skills to do the job for which they are in principle employed. Alternatively, 
there may simply be a lack of properly qualified people. In Rwanda, for example, the effects 
of the Genocide are still being faced in that those people who might now have been middle- 
to senior-ranking civil servants are absent because they were killed in 1994.  
Public–private dialogue (PPD) 
A further challenge lies in developing relationships between the public and private sectors. 
Nelson (2014) argues that in fragile states and post-conflict economies, there is often deep 
mistrust between the government and the private sector, resulting from prevalent rent-
seeking behaviours, cronyism, and lack of legitimacy. To overcome the lack of transparency 
and to create trust and confidence, it is imperative to engage the private sector in policy 
reform dialogue. Her work identifies a number of examples of good practice. For example, 
the Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business (MCRB) was established in 2013 to promote 
responsible foreign and domestic investment and business activities, with support from six 
donor governments, the Institute for Business and Human Rights, and the Danish Institute 
for Human Rights. MCRB works with government ministries, the Myanmar Investment 
Council, the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, foreign 
embassies, and various foreign investors like Total, Coca-Cola, Western Union, and 
Chevron. 
Utterwulghe (2014) argues the same case that PPD mechanisms have demonstrated ‘that 
they are effective trust-enabling platforms that allow all relevant stakeholders to work jointly 
in a transparent way on the identification of PSD constraints and the creation of sustainable 
policy reform solutions’(25). As Lemmon (2012:15), looking at business development in 
fragile states, concluded: ‘Partnerships among governments, non-profits, and corporations 
are critical. Long time frames are also important because sustainable SME growth is a long-
term process that requires capacity building and the development of local business 
environments. There should also be greater information sharing of lessons learned and 
efforts to scale solutions that have been successful’. 
Firm-level interventions 
It is also apparent that firm-level interventions are highly relevant. Based on GIZ’s 
experiences in the Palestinian Territories and Yemen, Schrade et al. (2016:22) argue that 
PSD has a role to play even in situations of hot conflict, providing benefits both in terms of 
economic development and peacebuilding. Indeed, in their view, ‘PSD has a huge 
comparative advantage to other development sectors (e.g. education, rule of law, or good 
governance) when it comes to contexts of open and sustained violence’. 
A special issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution (57/1) looks in detail at both the need 
and type of support required by entrepreneurs in conflict-affected and post-conflict states. 
This set of articles identifies three sets of policy implications. First, given the varied impacts 
of conflict, there is a need for support to be geographically specific. Second, given the need 
for companies to adjust to the realities of conflict, PSD policies that support companies in 
being adaptive so that they survive the conflict are vital. Third, because companies provide a 
means for economic growth and post-conflict employment (for example of ex-combatants), 
support to the private sector as a key part of peace deals can be an important element in 
making sure that those accords actually endure.  
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2.1.5 Approaching PSD in FCS 
As well as commenting on the types of intervention that are most useful in FCS, the literature 
also looks to a significant degree at how those interventions need to be structured, as well 
as what different factors need to inform the way in which PSD and other programming needs 
to be managed and undertaken. 
Monitoring and evaluation 
A key difference in undertaking PSD activities in an FCS context by comparison with a 
‘normal’ location is the need to focus on different – or, rather, additional – metrics. In most 
PSD programming, ‘success’ will usually equate to factors such as increases in the number 
of jobs or growth in levels of income. However, looking only at economic data in FCS is not 
sufficient, as ‘success’ on an economic level might come at the expense of worsening the 
conflict dynamics. In a study of privatisation in post-conflict countries, Venugopal (2014:1) 
concludes that the success of such programmes is generally seen through an economic 
prism, ‘such as the dollar value of privatisation receipts, increases in firm-level output, or 
productivity’. In his view, however, the reality is that this approach actually causes much 
greater problems in peacebuilding terms by entrenching inequities in society and thereby 
aggravating conflict dynamics. 
Indeed, Schrade et al. (2006:14) argue that there is a need to go further. As well as ensuring 
that interventions are based on proper peace and conflict assessments, as well as designed 
according to the ‘Do No Harm’ principles, there is also a need to monitor potential risks in 
real time. In regard to its operations in the Palestinian Territories and Yemen, GIZ has 
developed a ‘risk log system [that] allows close monitoring and immediate action if a specific 
activity proves to drive conflict or violence’. 
Balancing urgency and legitimacy 
A further issue highlighted in the literature is the tension, especially in post-conflict situations, 
between getting things done swiftly and getting them done in a way that builds legitimacy 
and buy-in from local audiences. As Channell (2010:5) argues, ‘donor organisations often 
rush to re-establish the framework for doing business, from rebuilding roads and 
marketplaces to revising laws and regulations’. The challenge with this, he argues, is that 
laws developed in such a way are not seen as legitimate – ‘effective policy reform … takes 
time in order to negotiate the human dynamics’. In his view, the key to this is the existence of 
a strong voice for the private sector, as ‘the business community knows better than any 
other group what constraints are standing in the way of business’. 
Jones and Howarth (2012) argue that short-term programming, however well intentioned, 
can be damaging to longer-term sustainability. Looking specifically at infrastructure projects, 
they criticise the ‘Quick Impact Project’ approach undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan since 
‘the approaches necessary to carry out implementation (for instance through construction 
undertaken by the military) may undermine the scope for local ownership through community 
consultation and participation’. 
2.2 The challenges facing middle-income countries 
In the past decade, the challenges facing middle-income countries in continuing their 
progress from poverty have been widely explored. The term ‘middle-income trap’ seems first 
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to have been used to describe apparent growth slowdowns in many former East Asian 
‘miracle’ economies (Gill and Kharas, 2007). A variation on the term had also been used in 
2006 about the sustainability of China’s economic development (Pei, 2006). Since then, the 
phenomenon by which countries rapidly acquire middle-income status only to stall at that 
point has been observed by several studies. Robertson and Le (2013:7) conclude from their 
analysis that ‘the growth trajectories of a large number of current middle-income countries 
are consistent with what we would expect to observe if they were in a middle-income trap’. 
2.2.1 Inclusive growth 
Supporting countries in continuing their progress from poverty is not simply about economic 
growth per se but also about ensuring that this growth benefits as wide a proportion of a 
country’s population as possible. This issue of inclusive growth is particularly pertinent to a 
study that focuses on the private sector given the considerable debate about whether 
companies promote pro-poor development or instead worsen inequalities. A recent 
statement by the EU (2014) argued that the ‘private sector can be an engine of inclusive 
growth by generating decent jobs, contributing to public revenue and providing affordable 
goods and services’. Likewise, according to an article by a senior Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) official (Venkatachalam, 2014), ‘the private sector promotes not just growth — it 
promotes inclusive growth’. A review of China’s development concluded that the private 
sector not only contributed to economic growth but also ‘helped the country to cope with the 
societal impacts of the decline in state industry’ (Hasan et al., 2009). 
However, other evidence suggests that the private sector can fail to foster inclusive growth. 
CAFOD (2011:8), for example, concluded that ‘oil, gas and mining operations may bring 
considerable FDI but create relatively few local jobs’. Other studies also suggest that while 
FDI can be beneficial to overall GDP numbers, it does not necessarily create broader-based 
growth, which depends on a number of variables. These include, for example, the strategies 
of the investing companies and the extent to which they are prepared to share knowledge 
and expertise with domestic firms (Spencer, 2008). The ability of local firms to absorb the 
technologies and practices presented by foreign companies is also important. Foreign 
investment therefore has greater developmental impacts when domestic firms are larger and 
the technological gap between them and incoming companies is smaller (Zhang et al., 
2010). 
2.2.2 Key challenges in addressing the middle-income trap 
What causes this stalling in progression from poverty? Studies by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (Aiyar et al., 2013), World Bank (Dinh, 2013), ADB (Felipe et al., ) and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Jankowska, 2012 ) 
have all sought to understand which factors assist a successful transition and which hinder 
it. Drawing on all these studies, the key factors are as follows: 
 Stability: This is seen as a sine qua non of continued development. Countries that are 
affected by war, conflict, or natural disasters will face significant challenges in 
maintaining stable development.  
 Political institutions and transparency: The institutional underpinnings of politics and 
the economy are of key importance. Four areas in particular are highlighted: size of 
government, rule of law, freedom to trade internationally, and the presence of effective 
regulation. 
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 Structured development: Whether by government edict or through government 
allowing the private sector space, countries succeed where there is a structured but 
realistic approach to development.  
 Economic management: Capital inflows are valuable, but macroeconomic stability is 
key, and public debt needs to be managed. Likewise, countries that rely too heavily on 
resource exports are also unstable.  
 Industrial diversification: Countries that have graduated most swiftly and successfully 
from lower-middle to upper-middle and then to high-income status have been those 
which had a greater diversity and sophistication of exports.  
 Internal and external resources and infrastructure: Inside a country, power, roads, 
and other infrastructure are essential, while a bulge in the working age ratio is also seen 
as an asset. External links are also important to success; for example, proximity to trade 
partners makes business more straightforward. 
2.3 Issues for this study 
This review of existing literature on FCS and middle-income states has identified a number 
of issues that this study will explore in more detail. These include the following: 
2.3.1 Regional issues 
It is clear from the literature on both middle-income countries and FCS that inter-country 
regional dynamics are a key factor, particularly in relation to commercial and private sector 
links. For example, middle-income countries are more likely to remain on their positive 
trajectory if they are located close to trading partners, while FCSs’ border disputes are more 
likely to be non-conflictual where there are mutual trade and commercial linkages. 
Additionally, given that many conflicts are regional in nature or have regional impacts, the 
international dimension is one that needs to be examined. 
2.3.2 Country context 
As noted above, stability is seen as virtually a sine qua non if a country wants to progress 
beyond middle-income status. The presence of conflict or tension is therefore a crucial 
challenge. A central issue for this study to address will be how PSD and related interventions 
can be used to create and support stability. It is likely that this will need to consider both 
short- and longer-term activities depending on the stage and nature of conflict, and for these 
activities to be effectively joined up. However, this will be complicated by the fact that the 
situation may vary considerably in different parts of a country, reflecting the fact that a 
conflict or conflicts may be geographically limited. 
2.3.3 The private sector 
The structure of the private sector and the constraints to its development – at all levels from 
firm level to the regulatory environment – are key to the capability of states to maintain and 
develop from middle-income status. However, it is clear from the literature review that not all 
segments of the private sector will necessarily be supportive of peacebuilding. Some 
elements may benefit from conflict (for a range of reasons) and there needs to be a clear 
assessment made of this. The literature stresses the need for robust conflict analysis when 
operating in FCS. However, in the case of PSD interventions, conflict analysis needs also to 
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extend to an examination of how different elements of the private sector might be factors in 
the conflict.  
The obverse of the above is to understand what structure for the private sector would be 
most beneficial to the stable development of the host country, and what challenges there 
might be to the development of that ideal. It is highly likely that the obstacles will be different 
for different aspects of the private sector. Foreign investors might be put off by perceived 
risk, whereas local firms might suffer from poor capacity or be hindered by elite capture of 
key elements of the economy. This study needs to explore what form of analytical framework 
would best serve to understand these issues properly. 
2.3.4 Tasks and roles in PSD 
It is clear from the literature that the issues impacting on the private sector are derivative of 
wider institutional and political challenges in a country. PSD programming therefore needs to 
be closely aligned with other streams of donor activity. This is not just to ensure an improved 
environment for the private sector but also to ensure that PSD programming is proactively 
supporting and buttressing wider conflict-management goals.  
It is also clear that PSD programming needs to encompass all aspects of a country’s private 
sector, which will range from foreign investors to large national firms, through to SMEs and 
other local firms. As the literature demonstrates, facilitating the private sector’s ability to 
diagnose the issues it faces through developing PPD platforms is of significant importance. 
However, it is important to maintain ongoing relationships and to engage companies (for 
example, foreign investors) that may not be present at the start.  
The literature also identifies a key role for blended finance mechanisms to reduce risk in 
FCS. Given that more donor governments are putting increasing amounts of money into 
vehicles such as the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG), the CDC (formerly 
the Commonwealth Development Commission), and the Dutch Good Growth Fund, it is 
important to look in more detail at how this may best be achieved. 
What is less clear, however, is where PSD programming should best focus. Given that many 
of the challenges companies face stem significantly from macro-level institutional issues, it 
may be most relevant for PSD to focus here. However, much of the literature points to the 
role of company- and market system-level interventions to provide the private sector with 
resilience and capacity at different phases of the conflict cycle. The current study will 
therefore have to establish the appropriate balance between macro-level interventions and 
those at a more local level, with different elements of the private sector and at different 
phases of the conflict cycle.  
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3 Regional context 
The literature strongly suggests that regional dynamics are important both in terms of a 
country’s ability to thrive economically and in relation to its conflict dynamics. Proximity to 
trade partners makes business more straightforward. Countries that are better positioned 
geographically – close to suppliers and customers, and on good trade routes – generally 
perform better than those which lack these advantages. As an IMF report observed, ‘the 
greater the GDP-weighted distance of a country from potential trade partners, the higher the 
probability of an economic slowdown. And the greater the share of intra-regional trade 
undertaken by a country, the less likelihood there is of an economic slowdown’ (Aiyar et al., 
2013:26). In the area of conflict and instability too, it is clear that regional factors play a key 
role. Miall et al. (2004) propose a framework for understanding the sources of conflict, which 
suggests that there are different levels at which causation of conflict occurs. They propose a 
‘levels of analysis’3 approach. In their view, conflict needs to be seen as caused by both 
international and domestic factors, which they refer to as International Social Conflict. These 
they define as ‘conflicts that are neither pure international (interstate) conflicts, nor pure 
social (domestic) conflicts, but sprawl somewhere between the two’. 
3.1 Economic and conflict impacts, and their inter-relation 
It is clear from the literature, and reinforced by the fieldwork for this study, that not only is it 
regional factors which have significant impacts on countries’ economy and conflict dynamics 
but also that these factors inter-relate to a considerable degree. 
Several of our focus countries have seen markets and trade seriously limited by instability 
and tension in neighbouring countries. In the case of Sudan, relations with key neighbours 
Egypt, South Sudan, and Eritrea are extremely tense. Ethiopia has until very recently had an 
ongoing frozen conflict with Eritrea, which historically provided Red Sea access. Regional 
trade can also be limited where a country sits adjacent to a regional economic community 
and thus does not have the same advantages as other neighbours. For example, Ethiopia 
sits adjacent to the East African Community, which facilitates economic activity between 
Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi. Lebanon and Egypt have both seen 
regional markets disappear or become inaccessible because of conflicts in their region. This 
is most strikingly illustrated by the impacts of the Syrian civil war: for both countries, Syria 
was both an important end market and a transit route to the countries of the Arabian Gulf.  
Ethiopia’s landlocked status is a key determinant of its political and trading relations with 
neighbours. With until recently a longstanding frozen conflict since Eritrean independence, 
Ethiopia lost its access to the sea as well as potential for cross-border trade with Eritrea. In 
response, it has forged links with Djibouti, Somaliland, and more recently Sudan to secure 
port access and facilitate trade. For Sudan, tense relations with neighbours limit cross-
border economic activity, including with Egypt and South Sudan. For both countries, 
communities in significant areas of the borderlands are pastoralist and share cultural and 
economic ties across borders; however, these are often marginalised communities in areas 
with little formal private sector activity. 
Non-economic factors also have significant bearing on regional economic relationships. 
These factors include religious alignment (including an inclination toward forging a national 
                                               
3 In this they draw on Levy’s chapter ‘Contending Theories of International Conflict: A Levels of Analysis 
Approach’ in Crocker and Hampson (1996). 
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Islamic identity in the case of Sudan) and linguistic ties (across the Arab world, for example). 
Also of relevance are a shared opposition to Islamist terrorism, desire to counter other 
powerful nations, and sometimes a shared opposition to ‘western’ interference. The last of 
these is illustrated by the case of Sudan being supported by others opposed to the 
International Criminal Court and other restrictive international frameworks, including Kenya 
and other African Union members as well as Russia). In several of our case study countries, 
shifting political allegiances and economic ties align. For example, Sudan has experienced 
shifting allegiances within the Arab world, often falling into a different power bloc to its 
immediate neighbour Egypt. Tensions within the Gulf Cooperation Council and Sudan’s 
refusal to sever ties with Qatar when it was accused by its neighbours of sponsoring 
terrorism are an example of this. More recently, growing ties between Sudan and Turkey 
appear to have both trade and strategic intentions, with suspicions that Turkey may establish 
a military base on Sudanese territory (much opposed by Sudan’s neighbours) as well as 
becoming a key investor. At the same time, a softening of global relations with Sudan, lifting 
of sanctions, increasing focus on macroeconomic reform, and potential business linkages 
have been linked by some to a desire by western donors to forge stronger relationships with 
potential security partners as allies in countering extremism. Relations between Ethiopia and 
key western donors have the desire for stability and security in a broadly unstable region as 
a key driver. Power blocs, then, are more complex and overlapping than during the cold war, 
with alliances forged on religious and cultural grounds as well as security imperatives and 
the potential for proxy wars in the case of Sudan and Egypt/Eritrea within the broader region. 
Moreover, the policy and aims of neighbours can be highly influential on a country’s 
potential. For example, Nepal’s most important strategic relationship is with India, with which 
it shares a 1,000-mile open border and strong historic, linguistic, religious, economic, and 
cultural ties. Nevertheless, political issues and border disputes strain this relationship. 
Nepal’s heavy reliance on Indian exports (fuel, for example) and on access to Indian ports 
has led to the country being described as ‘India-locked’ rather than simply landlocked. Some 
anti-Indian sentiment in the country is linked to perceptions of Indian meddling in Nepalese 
political affairs, most recently in regard to India’s effective five-month economic blockade of 
Nepal, which was linked to Nepal’s constitutional crisis in 2015. On the other side, the 
relationship with China has historically been much weaker, with the Himalayas acting as a 
major physical barrier. However, in 2017 Nepal joined China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative 
(allegedly against Indian lobbying for Nepal to stay out). Investment in infrastructure will lead 
to much greater connectivity in transit, roads, railways, trade, aviation, and power. The 
competing economic and strategic interests of China and India offer opportunities for Nepal; 
however, sovereignty concerns (potentially stoked by a protectionist domestic private sector) 
deter Nepal from fully benefitting from this strategic competition between its neighbours, 
undermining the potential for foreign investment in key economic sectors. 
Myanmar sits at the heart of Asia, bordered to the northwest by the nations of India and 
Bangladesh, to the southeast by Thailand and Laos, and by the People’s Republic of China 
to the northeast. Myanmar’s neighbours, particularly China, are the country’s chief export 
markets and the source of inward investment. China, India, and Thailand, along with South 
Korea and Malaysia, compete to invest in oil and gas extraction. China is also investing in 
infrastructure, such as taking a majority stake in the major new deep-sea port of Kyauk Pyu 
in Rakhine State, as well as investing in a special economic zone located at the port. These 
developments will secure China’s access to the Bay of Bengal and could represent the first 
step in a new China–Myanmar Economic Corridor connecting Kyaukpyu and Kunming in 
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China,4 although deals such as these are frequently criticised for limited economic benefits 
within Myanmar itself .5 At the same time as contributing to development, infrastructure and 
resource exploitation have been at the root of ongoing conflicts between the central 
government and ethnic minorities located mostly in Myanmar’s border areas.  
The literature argues that geographic linkages are strengthened and underpinned by ‘social 
proximity links’ between people who collaborate over time. Innovation and growth does not 
just occur because companies and their people are physically close together, but because 
they get along and want to work together. As Lorenzen and Mudambi (2012:506) make 
clear, ‘decentralized personal relationships have remained the dominant linkage type in 
value creation… Value is created through flexible linkages between persons rather than rigid 
linkages between organizations’. However, in situations where conflict and instability has 
disrupted these ‘social’ links it may be that the economic effects of a conflict situation persist 
even after a conflict has ended since these networks may take time to re-emerge. If 
prosperity comes to a degree from the interactions of individuals and companies, then 
disruption of these will be detrimental from an economic and business perspective.  
That said, it appears that in many cases diasporas provide a very valuable vehicle for 
maintaining these networks, contributing to economic growth even while instability persists. 
In the case of Lebanon, it is estimated that there are several times as many people around 
the world calling themselves Lebanese than the population of the actual country. Lebanese-
run businesses operate all over the world and provide a well-established network for 
commercial activity. In Ethiopia, diaspora return and investment has been a key feature in 
recent years. Some suggest that there is a tendency toward diaspora investment in real 
estate due to instability and fragility but also weak protections. Nevertheless, the creativity in 
diaspora-led business is evident in urban centres with businesses building on knowledge 
gained elsewhere, such as tech-based start-ups and design-based industries such as 
fashion and accessories. Furthermore, in Sudan it is evident that businesses adapt and 
expand based on extensive personal networks, including international networks, with big 
businesses forging partnerships internationally in order to gain new technical expertise and 
access to markets. The fact that the elite have travelled, lived, and studied internationally for 
several generations supports this. 
3.2 The importance of infrastructure 
From the perspective of trade and conflict, connective features such as dams, watercourses, 
resources, roads, and other infrastructure are extremely important. They can either be 
sources of opportunity and potential prosperity or they can be the focus of tension. It is 
extremely important therefore to consider infrastructure from a regional rather than just a 
national perspective. Building and supporting infrastructure that facilitates economic 
cooperation across borders is critical to long-lasting peace and stability. In the case of 
Ethiopia, which is dependent on neighbours for sea access, roads, railways, and port 
facilities are crucial. Recent initiatives have sought to improve cold storage along the main 
transit route to Djibouti while agreements to share port facilities are being forged with 
Somaliland and Sudan (which would require improved transport between Addis and Port 
                                               
4 Aung San Suu Kyi and President Xi Jinping agreed to establish such a corridor during a meeting in Beijing in 
December 2017: see https://amti.csis.org/kyaukpyu-china-indian-ocean/ (accessed 15 June 2018). 
5 Popular criticisms, for example, relate to the export of gas to Thailand while Myanmar is facing energy 
shortages. In addition, Khandelwai et al. (2018) found few direct economic spillovers from the special export zone 
at Thilawa near Yangon. 
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Sudan). At the same time, infrastructure in some border areas, such as along the border with 
Kenya or South Sudan, is negligible, which limits even very localised economic activity 
across borders. Roads, water points, markets, and storage facilities could all facilitate cross-
border market activity. 
Egypt and Sudan are potentially hugely affected by the policies of those further upstream in 
the Nile basin, with significant changes expected due to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam (GERD). In the case of Egypt, there is a fear that short-term reduction in Nile waters 
will negatively impact agricultural production and there has been a sharp deterioration in 
relations between Egypt and Ethiopia as a result. Sudan, in contrast, stands to benefit from a 
better regulated Nile flow and has less to lose in the short term due to current under-
utilisation of Sudan’s Nile waters. Sudan’s apparent support for GERD has, however, 
increased tensions between Egypt and Sudan. More broadly, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia 
are potentially impacted by other states within the Nile Basin Initiative, which exists in 
recognition of the interdependency of states in the Nile basin (including the Great Lakes) and 
seeks consensus and cooperation. 
In both Nepal and Myanmar, large-scale investments in infrastructure in ethnically controlled 
or marginalised areas also fuel tensions. The recent influx of foreign investment and the 
development of infrastructure and special export zones have exacerbated conflict in 
Myanmar.6 Ethnic armed organisations reject central government land and resource 
allocation to investors in the areas they control. In Nepal, while infrastructure (much of which 
was destroyed in the civil conflict) is badly needed for economic development, there are 
persistent tensions over community rights. Exploitation of hydropower has stoked conflict 
between communities and hydropower developers supported by the government, such as 
the violence at the Khimti Dhaldkebar plant in April and July 2016. 
3.3 Fear as well as reality 
Fear of the regional context influences popular opinion and political actions every bit as 
much as the reality of the situation. This fear may be stoked and manipulated in support of 
domestic political objectives. For example, in Egypt the fear of ‘becoming like Syria or Iraq’ is 
a powerful driver to current political dynamics and some degree of toleration of the policies 
of President Sisi. In Sudan, tensions with Egypt, Eritrea, and regional powers in the Middle 
East foster a nationalistic tendency and bolster an inclination to maintain the political status 
quo, while in Ethiopia the mantra that the country is an island of stability in a fragile region 
(and the need to maintain this) has detracted attention from internal instability. 
The legacy of previous conflict and instability is also of key importance in framing people’s 
outlook. The conflicts in Myanmar are related to control of territory, authority over 
populations, and access to resources in the regions bordering China and Thailand, which 
have experienced persistent and widespread conflict for over 50 years. Central to the 
conflicts are contested visions of what constitutes the nation. In Nepal, historically 
marginalised groups – many of whom supported the Maoists in the civil conflict – are 
pressing for a greater voice in politics, a greater share of economic benefits, and a 
recognition of their cultural identity. While cross-border issues, including blockades, 
                                               
6 5.2 million acres of land have been given to investors for large-sale agriculture concessions (Asia Foundation, 
2017). 
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investment, and smuggling, have fanned the flames in these countries, these are decidedly 
local affairs.  
3.4 Concluding remarks 
The evidence from this study demonstrates how significant can be the impact on a country of 
its regional context. Therefore, it is important for those seeking to support countries in 
building peace and economic growth to understand that context, as well as the impact it has 
domestically. 
A starting point is to understand the various ways in which a country may be affected by 
regional factors. This will include understanding the direct economic impacts of conflicts or 
tensions in neighbouring countries: Lebanon and Egypt, for example, have lost the 
significant Syria market and access to the Gulf States. Also important are the impacts of 
regional conflicts on a country’s physical security. Lebanon, for example, has been 
destabilised by the Syrian situation, while Egypt has the risk of instability caused by the 
Libyan civil war. 
Regional debates and squabbles can also have significant impacts on a country’s economic 
potential. Nepal, for example, will always be subject to the effects of decisions taken by 
India. Similarly, debates and discussions in regional forums will affect an individual country’s 
scope for movement. Tensions within the Gulf Cooperation Council and Sudan’s refusal to 
sever ties with Qatar when it was accused by its neighbours of sponsoring terrorism are an 
example of this. Crucially, whether and how key elements of infrastructure might affect a 
country are highly significant. Understanding these dynamics and proactively managing 
them or at least mitigating the risks is a key task of those in the development community.  
However, it is not just the direct impacts of regional instability that can have a domestic 
impact on a country: the perception and fear of instability can also be highly significant. 
Countries such as Egypt and Lebanon have seen their neighbours descend into crisis and 
civil war, and the desire to avoid the same fate is a very powerful driver in domestic politics. 
Also important are historical memories and grievances: history is still very much alive. These 
factors need to be understood and their significance appreciated since these ‘psychological’ 
impacts are highly pertinent.  
Regional issues are therefore fundamental to the ability to understand a country’s domestic 
context. These results may be direct, in terms of lost markets, for example, or indirect, in 
terms of the impacts on domestic opinion. In all cases, these factors need to be taken into 
account. 
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4 National context 
The previous chapter explored the regional factors impacting on the ability of a country to 
progress toward peace and prosperity. This chapter now looks at the challenges posed by 
the internal dynamics of the country itself. What domestic factors affect a country’s ability to 
maintain or attain stability, and to move on past middle-income status, and what can the 
international community do to help? 
4.1 Shifting dynamics of conflict and fragility 
Fragile middle-income countries face a shifting set of dynamics of conflict and fragility. Some 
processes of transition can be seen as a linear process in which steps and developments 
can be straightforwardly managed and planned. Addressing conflict and fragility is more 
complex, because the nature and intensity of these issues is in flux over time. In managing 
these issues, countries and their international backers are chasing a moving target.  
Moreover, there may be more than one source of instability that a country needs to address. 
All the countries reviewed for this study were selected because they were listed in DFID’s 
FCS analysis. However, what became apparent in relation to several of the countries is that 
the conflict or tension currently catching the headlines, and seen as the reason for that 
location’s inclusion in an FCS list, was not actually the main issue for concern. A good case 
in point is Lebanon, where the focus is on the huge Syrian refugee influx with which the 
country has had to cope over the past few years. According to the United Nations Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR), in June 2018 there were around 1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon.7 
This is by contrast to an existing population of around 6 million. This huge number of 
refugees in such a relatively small country has been seen as a significant source of potential 
fragility and a huge humanitarian relief effort has been mobilised. The UNHCR is 
campaigning to raise more than $2 billion to address the refugee crisis. However, serious 
though this issue is, Lebanon is dealing remarkably well with the refugees. The dynamic that 
would be more dangerous if it went awry would be the delicate balance between the different 
confessional groups.8 
For most investors and policymakers outside Myanmar, the intercommunal violence between 
Rohingya Muslims and the Buddhist population in Rakhine State represents the key source 
of fragility and violence (Asia Foundation, 2017). The eruption of violence in August 2017, 
and the 900,000 refugees from Rakhine now in Bangladesh, have been the focus of much 
attention.9 However, despite the scale and severity of the violence in Rakhine, it is not the 
only live conflict in Myanmar, nor the one with the most widespread consequences. Conflicts 
between the military and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) have been ongoing at least 
since Myanmar’s independence from the British in 1948, mostly concentrated in the regions 
bordering China and Thailand, which had a history of self-governance from before and 
during colonial rule. At least 21 EAOs are involved in conflicts related to the control of 
territory, authority over populations, and access to resources, although the fighting has 
generally been of low intensity in recent years (Asia Foundation, 2017; Burke et al., 2017) 
and ceasefires have been signed with a number of EAOs including the Chin National Front, 
the Karen National Union and the Pa-Oh National Liberation Organisation. Other ceasefires 
                                               
7 See http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria (accessed 16 June 2018). 
8 The Lebanese polity is divided into 18 ‘confessions’, which are ethno-religious groupings. The largest three are 
Christians, Shia Muslims, and Sunni Muslims.  
9 See http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/myanmar_refugees (accessed 16 June 2018). 
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have broken down, however, such as that with the Kachin Independence Army. In 2015 and 
2016, there were 1,022 clashes between the government and EAOs, mostly in Kachin and 
northern Shan state (Asia Foundation, 2017).  
4.2 Elite control: on whose behalf is government run? 
A factor that defines most of the countries reviewed for this study is that political control and 
patronage is held in the hands of a relatively small elite, who use government power and 
preferment to further their own interests, not necessarily those of the wider public. From the 
perspective of pro-poor development this is self-evidently a challenge, as government 
policies cannot be relied upon to focus on the needs of the poor but rather toward those of 
elite groups and their networks (as illustrated by Egypt, Nepal, and Sudan).  
In Egypt, the government is run by, and largely acts in the interests of, the military. President 
Sisi’s power base lies in the army – he is a former Field Marshal – and many of those 
interviewed observed that, even beyond the president, many of the key figures in 
government are from the military. The influence of the military thus spreads into all aspects 
of the country’s life. The Alexandria desert road was built by the army, and the military own 
businesses in many different sectors. Although nominally a democracy, the electoral process 
in Egypt is highly flawed. In the recent presidential election, the incumbent, Abdel Fattah el-
Sisi, used a mixture of tactics to exclude many rival candidates from standing. In the months 
before the election, all major, credible alternative candidates were removed, including Sami 
Anan, former Chief of Staff of the Egyptian armed forces, Colonel Ahmed Konsowa, and 
Ahmed Shafik, a former commander-in-chief of the Egyptian air force. In the election itself, 
only one candidate stood against Sisi, Moussa Mostafa Moussa, who was widely seen as a 
stooge. As one press report put it, Moussa had ‘endorsed Sisi for a second term and even 
organised events to help nominate the former military commander up until a week before the 
nomination deadline’ (Ibrahim, 2018). At the election itself, Sisi won more than 97% of the 
vote, albeit on a relatively low turnout of 41%. This centralised control is accompanied by the 
serious abuse of many human rights. Human Rights Watch accuse Sisi of overseeing the 
‘worst human rights crisis in decades’, in which ‘police systematically used torture, arbitrary 
arrests, and enforced disappearances to silence political dissent. Thousands of civilians 
were tried by military courts. By introducing new restrictive NGO legislation, detaining 
journalists, and prosecuting human rights defenders and subjecting them to travel bans, the 
government is working to eradicate independent civil society in the country.’10 
If the situation in Egypt is one in which a single military elite control the country, Lebanon 
has a situation in which a series of elites control that political and governmental process. 
Lebanon is home to a multiplicity of different groupings based on a mixture of religion and 
politics. As was touched on above, there are 18 so-called ‘confessions’, which are based on 
the make-up of the country in the 1932 census. Seats in parliament are allocated according 
to these confessional groups, and the senior positions in government are allocated to the 
three largest groupings: the president will always be a Maronite Christian; the Speaker of the 
Parliament, a Shi'a Muslim; and the Prime Minister, a Sunni Muslim. As a result of this 
approach, political debates are not on the basis of ideology or of a coherent policy platform 
but rather on the basis of confessional bias. This system is a recipe for inertia. The 2018 
election was the first to happen in nine years, parliamentarians having extended their term 
three times since the last elections in 2009. Making any meaningful change happen is a 
                                               
10 See www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/egypt (accessed 14 June 2018). 
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considerable challenge as this requires securing the support of different confessional groups 
and of the vested interests to which they owe fealty.  
Nepal’s political settlement is based on exclusionary patronage, rent-seeking, and corrupt 
relations between economic and political elites, which weaken the country’s economic 
prospects. This system is largely well understood and accepted by all key stakeholders, 
making it stable and difficult to dislodge. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal and the armed 
conflict that emerged from it was fuelled by this political and economic exclusion. The 
Maoists were able to garner support from groups who felt left behind, particularly lower 
caste, regional, and ethnic groups. They were therefore able to gain significant sway over 
the countryside by the end of a war that destroyed infrastructure, disrupted production and 
trade, weakened private sector investment and led to firm closures, expended limited 
resources (e.g. on arms and military spending), and distracted the government from 
economic issues.11 Since the end of the ‘people’s war’ in 2006, Nepal has been engaged in 
a protracted political transition toward federalism as a response to the grievances that 
contributed to conflict. The idea behind this is to give ethnic, caste, or regional groups such 
as the Madhesi in the Terai region a greater voice in politics and a greater share of 
economic benefits. 
Sudan’s party system, too, is dominated by one party, the National Congress Party, a 
creation of the ruling military-backed government to build a popular support base. Major 
opposition parties boycotted ‘democratic’ elections in 2010 and 2015, with the result that the 
outcomes were not universally recognised. Use of force to suppress popular demonstrations 
against tightening austerity and cuts to government subsidies in 2013 left little confidence in, 
or enthusiasm for, the elections of 2015. Autocratic and repressive behaviour by Bashir’s 
government has increased while key figures within the military and security forces are 
believed to have substantial control over politicians, including cabinet members. Civil 
society, the media, and international NGOs are closely watched and targeted. Harassment 
of opposition politicians and the press has increased, and the government has continued to 
use force in Darfur, the Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains.  
4.3 Challenges in government capability and capacity 
The challenges presented by elite control are compounded by the fact that the civil services 
in many countries are inefficient. This makes effecting change – and, more importantly, 
making sure it sticks – harder.  
In Ethiopia, there are administrative structures at various levels throughout most of the 
country, alongside a strong network of security structures, and these enforce laws, collect 
taxes, and bear responsibility for provisions of social services such as health, transportation, 
water, electricity, etc. However, the strength of these institutions declines with distance from 
Addis Ababa. While security provision is strong, other services are either weak or seen as 
mechanisms of government control. Protests in Oromia and Amhara against government 
institutions such as prisons, service centres and office buildings, health facilities, and 
cooperatives reflect a perception that these places exist to control the population more than 
to perform their purported functions. 
                                               
11 Growth in the 10 years before the war averaged 4.9%, versus 4.0% during the war and 4.1% in the period 
since the war (UNCTAD, 2011). 
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In Egypt, it was widely reported by interviewees that nepotism is widespread in government 
appointments. Families make use of their contacts and wasta (influence) to get their children 
jobs in government. Such jobs are seen as being very desirable and prestigious by contrast 
to jobs in the private sector. The result is a public sector that is both bloated in numbers and 
ineffective in its delivery. Officials are in place because of their connections, not their 
capabilities. However, the pressure to reform the public sector is apparently lacking. The 
regime itself finds it difficult to effect change through what are seen as cumbersome 
administrative bureaucracies. Therefore, tasks are given to the military to avoid logjams. For 
example, a project to build a road between Cairo and Alexandria was bogged down in 
government for many years until it was handed to the army to complete. While this approach 
has the advantage of making sure that things get done, it removes any pressure on 
government bureaucracies to change and improve over time.  
In Myanmar, challenges arise due to rapid economic policy reform in the context of limited 
government policy capacity, leading to ad hoc decisions, while the limited technical capacity 
of bureaucrats at middle and low levels of government contributes to unpredictability. Under 
the military regime, lower-ranking officials were used to top-down instructions and there is 
consequently a lack of capacity or culture of autonomy. Minor issues are escalated, further 
delaying decision-making. 
4.4 Political economy and fragility analysis 
It is vital to understand what is actually going on in middle-income countries and FCS: 
viewing such places through the lens of international norms may not be helpful. The potential 
‘inappropriateness’ of typical donor approaches is demonstrated in the case of the Central 
Bank in Myanmar. In 2013, the bank gained independence under the reformist president, 
Thein Sein, which was celebrated as a positive step by international investors. Some 
questioned how independent the Central Bank would really be as the incoming governor, 
Kyaw Kyaw Maung, had also held the post in the period from 1997 to 2007 when Central 
Bank decisions were manipulated by the government. However, the real problem has turned 
out to be the independence of the Bank and its governor, which have delayed reforms that 
are being promoted by the government, particularly the needed modernisation of the 
financial sector. Lack of access to capital due to these stalled reforms is a top business 
environment constraint in Myanmar. Some were hoping that once Aung San Suu Kyi took 
power she would remove him from office, given that he was appointed by her predecessor. 
However, that would have been a clear violation of the rule of law, which she is trying to 
uphold, so the governor has stayed.  
In Egypt too, the situation is more nuanced than it might appear at first sight. President Sisi 
is widely presented internationally as a military strong man. Commenting on Sisi’s 2011 visit 
to the UK, The Guardian newspaper referred to the Egyptian President as ‘an autocrat’ 
(Shenker, 2011). More recently, Foreign Policy magazine published an article stating that 
‘Sisi is getting pretty good…at being a dictator’ (Cambanis, 2015). By contrast, many of 
those interviewed in Egypt argued that Sisi’s approach was not only necessary but even a 
desirable one to keep the country secure in a highly unstable region. People point to the civil 
war in Syria, the ISIS insurgency in Iraq, and, slightly further afield, the situation in Libya. 
Many conclude that, even if Sisi’s policies have some undesirable effects, these are 
relatively unimportant if the result is that Egypt is able to remain stable. In this context, the 
usual policy focus of the international community’s emphasis on free and fair elections, 
human rights, and so on is problematic. A number of those interviewed commented 
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adversely on this agenda: ‘the last time we tried proper elections, we ended up with the 
Muslim Brotherhood’ was the observation of one person,12 expressing succinctly the views of 
others. 
Clearly, therefore, high-quality political economy and conflict analyses are essential. These 
need to be completely open and not in any way shaded by wishful thinking. Before they start 
work, development programmers need to understand how things really are, and how they 
are viewed by locals – not how they would like to see them. 
4.5 How much change is desirable? 
While it might appear that the political situations in the focal countries are problematic, 
careful consideration needs to be given to assessing how much change is actually desirable. 
No matter how problematic the status quo might be, alternatives may well be a lot worse. 
Moreover, policy proposals from the international community may be regarded as 
undesirable by key constituencies. In developing their policy recommendations, donors and 
other international actors need to consider some key questions. First, how likely is it that the 
political settlement or institutions that we would like to be achieved through our interventions 
will actually come about, or work in the way we intend it? Second, if it does not, by shaking 
the political tree might we actually end up with a situation that is, in reality, much more 
problematic than the status quo?  
The situation in Lebanon is a case in point. The political settlement, based on the 18 
‘confessions’, leads to a situation where political consensus is hard to achieve and each 
political grouping plays to its confessional gallery. This situation is widely blamed for failure 
to make progress on key issues such as the improvement in energy supply. However, here 
again, any attempt to address the political torpor needs to consider the effects of disrupting 
what might alternatively be seen as a delicate political skein. One interviewee13 described 
the political situation in Lebanon as being like a sheet of fabric being pulled in different 
directions. However, rather than being a bad thing, the pull on that fabric keeps it taught and 
resilient: seeking to change the balance of power might result in the stresses on the political 
fabric altering, with the result that it will rip. In the case of Lebanon, this means that a country 
that has remained relatively stable despite the huge pressures on it may dissolve into civil 
war and anarchy. The implications of this for the country, the region, and for the wider global 
migration situation would be severe.  
In Sudan, while the lifting of sanctions was never thought of as a panacea for severe 
economic challenges, the opportunity it presented for reform has been squandered, with the 
government waiting three months before instituting reforms that exposed an extremely 
fragile economy. The fallout from this has increased pressure on the president and pushed 
an estimated 1.6 million people into humanitarian need in the first half of 2018. A fuel crisis 
has led to fuel being sold on the black market instead of being used to support agriculture, 
increasing food insecurity in the medium-term. Even large companies are struggling to afford 
export costs. This indicates that governments transitioning from conflict and fragility need 
support to plan and sequence reforms, including analysing potential impacts. Where 
capacity is known to be weak, conversations around these issues prior to any significant 
change are essential. 
                                               
12 Interview, Cairo, March 2018. 
13 Interview, Beirut, April 2018 
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A question often posed is how, if at all, FCS differ from ‘normal’ developing countries. It is 
perhaps this issue which points up, most sharply, the difference between them. In ‘normal’ 
places, experiments can be made in regard to how change might be bought about and, if an 
approach fails, then the downside is relatively minor. Given how finely balanced the situation 
in FCS is, if a change agenda goes wrong then the downside is not merely a poor annual 
review on the donor programmes involved – it is the possible re-emergence of war and 
conflict. 
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5 The private sector 
The private sector has the potential to drive economic growth and therefore to help countries 
move from middle-income to high-income status. A thriving and open private sector can also 
be a key element in building stability and thus in reducing fragility. However, this research 
project has identified a number of factors reducing the ability of the private sector to do these 
things. 
5.1 Business context 
Aside from issues of elite control, the private sector in the countries studied faced a number 
of other challenges to growth and expansion. Perhaps the most significant are challenges of 
regulation, governance, and the business environment. A key marker – perhaps the key 
marker – of a country’s likely ability to continue a progression from poverty, and to recover 
from conflict, is the quality of its governance and its institutions. This study has identified 
clearly how the lack of functional institutions acts as a severe brake on the development of 
the private sector. Poor regulation, poor corporate governance, and a weak operating 
environment are major constraints in all the countries surveyed. This is demonstrated clearly 
by the generally poor (sometimes very poor) rankings that all of the study countries receive 
on international benchmarks for governance and transparency. 
Table 1: Rankings of focal countries on key international business indicators  
Indicators Sudan Ethiopia Egypt Nepal Myanmar Lebanon 
Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index 
201714 
16 35 32 31 30 28 
World Economic Forum 
(WEF) Global 
Competitiveness Index 
2017/18 ranking (out of 137 
countries)15 
N/A 108 100 88 N/A 105 
World Bank Doing Business 
Indicators 2018 Overall 
Ranks16 
(of 190 countries) ** 
170 161 128 105 171 133 
 
Lebanon, for example, is ranked 133rd out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s Doing 
Business Indicators. Particular issues identified by the study are resolving insolvency, where 
Lebanon is ranked 147th, trading across borders (140th), and starting a business (143rd). 
Given the small size of the domestic Lebanese market, the second of these challenges – 
trading across borders – might explain why many Lebanese choose to establish businesses 
off-shore. This means that the government loses out on tax revenues that would be 
generated by such businesses, and jobs are not created domestically.  
                                               
14 www.doingbusiness.org/rankings | Scale: Highly corrupt (0-9) ------ (90-100) Very clean  
15 www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 
16 www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2017-
2018/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2017%E2%80%932018.pdf 
Private sector development in countries progressing to peace and prosperity 
HEART (High-Quality Technical Assistance for Results) 27 
The WEF Global Competitiveness Index ranks Egypt 115th out of 138 countries studied, and 
identifies major rigidities that plague its goods, labour, and financial markets, on which the 
country ranks 112th, 135th, and 111th, respectively. Egypt performs particularly poorly on 
the quality of its macroeconomic environment, where only four other countries perform 
worse.  
The World Bank’s 2017 Doing Business Report showed Sudan’s performance deteriorating. 
Sudan ranked 168th in 2017 out of 190 countries (it was ranked 153rd in 2014). Around 
64.7% of the companies surveyed identified corruption as a major constraint to doing 
business,17 while 76.8% identified tax rates as a major constraint. Moreover, 21% of 
companies identified business regulation as the biggest constraint and 21% cited tax rates 
and administration. Other significant factors cited include power cuts, political instability, and 
informal sector competition. An unstable exchange rate and parallel foreign exchange 
systems, as well as high inflation, represent major risks to private sector stability. Difficulties 
in accessing foreign exchange and restrictions on particular types of loans make it difficult 
for banks to manage risk. This is perhaps the overriding constraint and the primary focus for 
reform. There is also limited access to financial services due to poor financial infrastructure 
like credit reporting and collateral registry systems. The provision of financial services is, 
moreover, highly concentrated in Khartoum State. There is very limited access to finance in 
rural areas, where no banking branches operate and potential borrowers are lacking 
collateral. The US sanctions constrained Sudan’s financial sector’s ability to engage in global 
financial markets, as most overseas banks sought to avoid all risk of contravening sanctions. 
Conflict in Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan states served to undermine investor 
confidence, with international investors perceiving Sudan as a risky investment environment 
overall but also stopping many business activities in insecure areas. That said, thanks to 
Sudan’s links with Gulf markets and the impressive flexibility of Sudanese firms, the 
economy remained relatively dynamic despite these restrictions until 2018, when it has now 
hit a crisis. 
Ethiopia also slid downward in the World Bank Doing Business Report, moving from 159 to 
161 in overall ranking out of 190 economies in 2017. Ethiopia is ranked 174th for starting a 
business (an improvement over five years) but has seen a significant decline in the area of 
taxation, moving from 90th to 133rd. This is indicative of a significant burden of mandatory 
taxation for medium-sized business as well as costs associated with tax administration. 
Ethiopia remained unchanged on cross-border trading at 167 out of 190. The Doing 
Business Report showed Ethiopia as a top performer within sub-Saharan Africa on enforcing 
contracts (68/90) but other indicators remain troubling, including dealing with construction 
permits (169/190) and registering property (139/190). The change in taxation requirements 
reflects issues raised by several informants around a confused taxation system, 
inconsistently understood and applied to the extent that businesses may suddenly receive 
hefty tax demands that make their ongoing operations unfeasible, putting some out of 
business. While efforts to improve revenue from business are supported in general, these 
are not being rolled out in a systematic manner and often appear arbitrary. This is a good 
example of reforms needing to be joined up and regulatory reform needing to be coupled 
with institutional reform and capacity building to ensure sound implementation.  
Myanmar ranks 171st of 190 countries in the World Bank’s Doing Business survey, far 
behind the regional average and the lowest among our countries – just behind Sudan. 
Access to finance is a major constraint alongside an inadequately skilled workforce and lack 
                                               
17 See www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploreeconomies/2014/sudan (accessed 15 June 2018). 
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of access to electricity. Instability in the political and policy environment and the overall rule 
of law (including corruption and contract enforcement) are also issues, although several 
interviewees noted recent improvements in the legal framework. That said, constraints 
persist at the level of the bureaucracy due to lack of capacity and risk aversion, which means 
that lower-ranking staff pass basic decisions up to the highest levels in the ministry, leading 
to delays and distracting senior officials from more strategic matters. 
5.2 Elite interference and corruption 
In practice, large areas of the private sector in the countries studied are not really 
competitive enterprises but are controlled by elite groups and derive their profits from rents 
extracted due to their size and power as well as a distortionary policy environment. As well 
as the official state-owned enterprises that dominate in, for example, Sudan and Egypt, there 
are also significant business interests controlled by the army, government ministers, or 
groups close to either of these. This situation is compounded by often-severe corruption.  
In Ethiopia, the government recognises that private companies play an important role in 
realising the country’s development objectives but there is huge concentration of market 
power in the hands of party-affiliated companies and public enterprises. The process of 
privatisation, underway since the early 1990s, is heavily influenced by political 
considerations and progress has been slow. The legacies of the previous socialist system 
have been hard to shake off. There is a dominance of formerly  state-owned enterprises as 
well as of enterprises with links to the military and to key political allies, while ethnically 
connected business elites thrive. These discourage new entrants to the market among the 
Ethiopian private sector, which remains small. Space for what might be considered the ‘real 
private sector’ is limited. Investment decisions appear to be influenced by an assessment of 
whether politically connected or state-owned enterprises would move in to claim the space 
created. This was one reason given for the dominance of real estate investment and large 
construction projects in urban centres rather than productive or trading enterprises 
elsewhere, which are seen to have greater risks as well as more fierce competition. Without 
a level playing field, the appetite for risk is low among the domestic private sector. 
Similarly, in Sudan, state ownership of enterprises, direct and indirect, at national and state 
levels, distorts markets, as the presence of state firms provides a strong disincentive to 
private entry (AfDB, 2016). It was noted that a body of nominally private sector entities had 
developed around the ruling party since 1989, winning state contracts and gaining favour in 
return for political support. These were distinct from the handful of longer-established large 
family companies that were able to thrive without explicit political alignment, often due to the 
extensive social and political networks they have so that, while they are politically engaged, 
they are not politically aligned per se. Furthermore, military and security forces have spun off 
a number of companies that the state appears to protect. Newer, smaller businesses 
described a need to carefully navigate this space in order to avoid what they consider 
ethically unacceptable practices. This appeared to be less problematic among younger 
business people in newer creative industries where competition from traditional industries is 
less of a factor and space cannot easily be claimed by like-for-like businesses.  
In Lebanon too, elite control over key sectors of the private sector is considerable, with 
similar distorting results on the private sector and on the efficient functioning of the economy. 
Lebanon performs very poorly on international corruption indices. For example, 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index places Lebanon 143rd out of 180 
Private sector development in countries progressing to peace and prosperity 
HEART (High-Quality Technical Assistance for Results) 29 
countries surveyed.18 In interviews, it was reported that most senior politicians have 
significant private interests, which they use their political position to favour. Prime Minister 
Saad Hariri, for example, remains the Chairman of Saudi Oger, which was established by his 
father in 1975. Saudi Oger has interests in construction, real estate development and 
telecoms and facilities management.19 
Elite control also operates in ways other than ownership of companies themselves, as the 
electricity supply in Lebanon illustrates. Most of the country lacks round-the-clock grid 
electricity and load-shedding schedules are posted in many buildings.20 As a result, many 
people are obliged to pay for additional power from privately owned generation companies, 
who in turn pay kick-backs to those in political power. According to an Economist article on 
this subject (2015), ‘generator owners in Beirut’s southern suburbs say that, in order to 
operate, they must pay a fluctuating monthly fee to street-level officials of local Shia militias, 
which are also tied to prominent political parties. The same goes for many towns and 
villages, whether Christian, Muslim or Druze’. It was also reported in a number of interviews 
that these private generation companies lobby hard to prevent the improvements in the grid 
power system that would undermine their market position.  
In Nepal, the formal economy is controlled by a group of family-owned conglomerates or 
‘business houses’ that are dominated by certain caste groups, particularly the Marwadis and 
the Newars. These business houses are well connected, both to each other through family 
and marriages and to the government. Leaders of business houses have also recently been 
entering politics. As a result of their connections, business houses benefit from patronage 
links and subsequent policy ‘rents’. Informal access barriers, collusion, and price fixing are 
common and tolerated by regulators (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016). Cartels dominate many 
sectors, whether through proactive collusion or inadvertent interactions through close 
personal ties, undermining productivity and limiting contestability in the sector. Trucking and 
public transport associations are often held up as a prime example, with explicit price fixing, 
use of worn-out vehicles, and overloading of cargo. A series of government regulations and 
quotas help perpetuate this system and restrict free entry into the sector. The net effect is to 
deter foreign investment and new domestic entrants and to obstruct the development of the 
vibrant and dynamic transport sector. The high cost of production (linked in part to cartels) 
and low productivity in the Nepalese economy undermines economic competitiveness and 
job creation.  
In Myanmar, the processes of political and economic transition since 1988 have enabled the 
emergence of a group of companies from being largely military cronies into an oligarchy 
whose power is no longer dependent on these connections (Ford et al., 2016). These 
conglomerates benefitted from two waves of privatisation that allowed them to consolidate 
dominant positions in many markets. As they have gained economic power, their ability to 
actively influence politics has also grown. They continue to defend and benefit from 
regulations that make accessing the economy difficult, such as rigid licensing and permits, 
restricted bank lending rules, and government-controlled interest rates. Even the recently 
elected civilian government appears to have recognised the conglomerates as a reality to be 
worked with rather than opposed, since they retain considerable structural power that limits 
the options of policymakers. Some of these conglomerates are led by those retaining strong 
                                               
18 See www.transparency.org/country/LBN (accessed 14 June 2018). 
19 See www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/people.asp?privcapId=1611621 (accessed 15 June 2018). 
20 Indeed, so prevalent is the problem that an app has been developed to provide users with advance warning of 
power outages: https://itunes.apple.com/gb/app/beirut-electricity/id434106511?mt=8  
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personal links to the military, including military officers themselves.21 Recently, a handful of 
those companies with a more commercially minded or reformist leadership have been 
seeking to clean up their reputation and legitimise their role in the economy, potentially to 
strengthen their future competitiveness. This may create a more suitable opening for those 
seeking to influence the status quo given that a direct challenge is unlikely to succeed. 
However, corruption can affect the private sector in other ways too. In Egypt, a key 
challenge is the ability to hire properly qualified staff and central to this challenge is 
corruption and inefficiency in the education system. A number of interviewees argued that, 
because many teachers are poorly paid, they increase their income by tutoring young 
people. This means that the quality of education in state schools is falling, with tutors 
available only to those whose families are able to pay. This growing skills challenge is 
reflected by Egypt’s poor ranking in the WEF Global Competitiveness Index (112/138). 
Resultantly, even if Egypt were able to create jobs, the skills base may not be there to take 
them up. 
5.3 Military control 
In Egypt, the challenge is the gradual encroachment of the army into many different areas of 
the economy. As a 2014 report put it, ‘the military's business activities appear to be 
expanding – from the manufacture of basic items such as bottled water and furniture into 
mega-infrastructure, energy and technology projects’ (Hauslohner, 2014). In recent years, 
lack of foreign currency and mismanagement have regularly led to shortages of basic 
commodities, which the military has been able to leverage for publicity and expansion of its 
own businesses. In January 2017, for example, the Egyptian government reacted to months-
long drug shortages and price rises for those that remained available by granting the armed 
forces a licence to form a pharmaceutical company. One assessment makes clear that the 
expansion of the armed forces into a wide range of business sectors means that, in effect, 
the military control the economy: ‘By protecting the strategic assets of its major investment 
partners during periods of unrest and taking control of the bidding process for major 
government procurement, the Egyptian Armed Forces have become the primary gatekeeper 
for the Egyptian economy’(Marshall, 2015). 
The expansion of military control also has significant impacts on those elements of the 
private sector not connected to the military. The military’s access to cheap labour, resources, 
and influence mean that it has an in-built advantage in any area in which it operates. Many 
of those interviewed observed that whole areas of the economy are, in effect, no-go areas 
for non-connected companies, for example in areas such as construction and cement 
production. Furthermore, several of those interviewed observed that any new sector that 
appears to be expanding is likely to attract the attention of the military. This obviously acts as 
a significant disincentive for private actors to invest in sectors in which the military might 
become involved, and so make those investments untenable. Similarly, it was reported that 
companies resist growing too large as the military may wish to take a stake in expanding 
businesses.  
                                               
21 Two of the major conglomerates are run directly by the military: the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) 
and the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd (UMEHL). 
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5.4 The structure of the private sector 
In all the countries studied for this report, challenges also exist in relation to how the private 
sector is structured. These problems include a lack of middle-sized companies able to link 
large ones with small ones, an uneven spread of corporate activity across the country, and a 
desire to focus on high-profile ‘prestige’ projects rather than on creating job-rich economic 
development. 
Most countries studied have a private sector in which there is a missing middle – there are 
instead a small number of large companies (often preferentially owned by members of the 
elite) and a large number of small ones. In Egypt, for example, there are an estimated 2.3 
million companies, of which around 90% are thought to be micro-enterprises or SMEs (AfDB, 
2015). By contrast, there is only a relatively small number of large companies, including 
locally held conglomerates such as Orascom and a number of foreign multinationals 
operating in the country. This was also particularly noticeable in Sudan, where one informant 
challenged the researcher to find a ‘mid-sized company’. The few large, well-established 
companies appear to grow ever larger and to some extent monopolise key sectors. Newer 
entrants do not appear to have space to grow as they come into competition with established 
business as well as politically connected enterprises. In Myanmar, there is no indication that 
the political and economic changes underway are leading to a significant growth in business 
start-ups, with access to capital again a major constraint (Amine and Stockmann, 2015). In 
Nepal, SMEs find it difficult to enter and survive and there has been an ageing of firms over 
time. Based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys in 2008 and 2012, the average firm age in 
Nepal increased by 4.6 years, i.e. by the time elapsed between the two surveys. This 
suggests that either no new firms were formed or that newer firms fail to survive (World 
Bank, 2018a).  
There is also a tendency for the private sector to be focused heavily only in some parts of 
the country. In Egypt, the focus is on Cairo, Alexandria, the Nile Delta, and the area around 
the Suez Canal. In 2015, the Egyptian government launched the Suez Canal Economic 
Zone, which plans to create an industrial and logistics hub surrounding the canal. Work is 
underway to expand and develop the zone’s ports, so they can handle bigger vessels and 
accommodate activities such as trans-shipment, with the facilities to handle, store, and 
repackage cargo. Tunnels are being dug under the canal to improve connectivity between its 
two banks. However, this type of prestige project will not address the challenge of providing 
jobs to the majority of the population, who live further south in Egypt and who will not benefit 
at all from any further development in the Canal Zone. Alaa Arafa, of Arafa Holding, one of 
Egypt’s biggest garment exporters says proximity to labour is more important than being 
near a port: ‘It is no good building a factory then transporting people to work in it’ (Saleh, 
2017). 
This focus on prestige projects, rather than working to drive economic development in the 
poorer, southern areas of Egypt, risks further exacerbating the gap between the haves and 
have-nots in the country. As noted in the previous chapter, perhaps the most significant 
ongoing risk to Egypt’s stability is that posed by the rapid expansion of the country’s 
population. Even though the youth bulge has yet to fully make its presence felt in the labour 
market, youth unemployment reached 26.7% in 2016. While inefficiencies in the labour 
market itself exist, a central problem is a miss-match between labour supply and demand. A 
recent survey by the International Labour Organization showed that around 48% of Egyptian 
young people are working in jobs that do not match their education, while 8.8% are 
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overeducated for their role and so earn less than deserved, and 39% are undereducated, 
which has an adverse effect on their productivity (Barsoum et al., 2016). 
Similarly, in Sudan, business is centred on Khartoum as well as on agriculture along the Nile 
Valley and trading through Port Sudan. Rain-fed agriculture is found in the west, including in 
Darfur, but is underdeveloped. Areas that remain conflict-affected are also economically 
marginalised. Given ongoing insecurity, this appears self-perpetuating and risks deter 
investment. 
In Ethiopia, industry centres on Addis Ababa and other major urban centres and business is 
owned by elites. Current government industrial policy is creating industrial parks in different 
locations, which aim to attract both foreign and domestic investment and create jobs in 
strategic locations through the country (albeit primarily extremely low-paid manufacturing 
jobs). However, marginal areas such as Gambella, Somali area, and the south see little 
large-scale private sector activity. At the extreme, some pastoralist areas have virtually no 
market economy as nearby towns are out of reach with poor infrastructure and goods are not 
available locally. However, elsewhere in some pastoralist areas trading does occur, including 
cross-border trade in meat. 
There appeared to be hopeful signs of a generational shift in terms of creation of new 
businesses with the establishment of small creative, highly skilled, and knowledge-based 
industries, including in ICT, marketing, fashion, the arts, and events in Ethiopia, Myanmar, 
and Sudan. These often rely on returning diaspora (‘repats’ as they are known in Myanmar) 
or in the case of Ethiopia also educated people who do not see formal jobs available to them 
and are no longer attracted by the civil service. Such businesses do not impinge on existing 
business space in traditional industries. Innovative programmes to support entrepreneurship 
can help harness energy in this regard.  
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6 Tasks and roles in PSD 
In this chapter we now turn to the question of what PSD programming is needed in countries 
that are both dealing with fragility and seeking to continue their growth through middle-
income status. This chapter also explores the other actors with whom development agencies 
collaborate.  
6.1 Tasks  
PSD programming has clear tasks to achieve and these need to be incorporated into the 
wider development trajectory of the host country. These are discussed in turn in the 
subsections that follow. 
6.1.1 Macro-level coordination 
PSD cannot operate on its own, but rather needs to be intrinsically linked to areas such as 
governance, peacebuilding, education, etc. As one interviewee said, when operating in a 
low-income country, it is often possible to design PSD interventions in such a way as to 
avoid wider issues of corruption and political competence and control. On the contrary, in 
middle-income countries and FCS these issues are unavoidable. Sensitivity is needed to 
tackle these issues as part of the wider ‘development equation’.  
However, despite greater efforts on the part of development organisations to bring together 
people working on different issues, the evidence of this report is that more work is still 
needed in this regard. At a workshop held to discuss the initial findings of our study, a 
number of those attending observed that working with the private sector is still not seen as a 
priority for those working in peacebuilding. A number of those interviewed in-country 
suggested that the obverse is also true, i.e. that PSD programmes do not always take proper 
account of the conflict dynamics, and different streams of programming are not always 
coherently focused on addressing the roots of fragility.  
While not directly PSD related, macroeconomic stability is an important ingredient in the 
development of a strong economy. In recent years, support from international financial 
institutions has been crucial in keeping some of the countries studied from bankruptcy. In the 
case of Lebanon, the recent Cedre IV conference in Paris provided nearly $11 billion in soft 
loans and grants. In November 2016, the Executive Board of the IMF approved financial 
assistance for Egypt in the form of an Extended Fund Facility arrangement for $12 billion. 
Funding was also forthcoming from bilateral donors and is widely credited with having 
stopped the country collapsing.  
In Sudan, DFID has identified the urgent need for macroeconomic reform as a precursor to 
serious private sector engagement. While some Sudanese businesses have been adept at 
navigating an extremely challenging macroeconomic environment with problems accessing 
foreign exchange, highly variable exchange rates, and a lack of formal financing mechanisms, 
overall these are barriers to new investment. Similarly, in Ethiopia a lack of access to foreign 
exchange markets was cited as one of two key barriers to the private sector. 
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6.1.2 Investment climate reform 
As we noted in the previous chapter, all the countries studied fare badly (some very badly) 
on international benchmarks of the business environment. This is likely to be a factor in most 
countries struggling to maintain or create peace, and to grow their economy.  
Unsurprisingly, therefore, efforts to reform the business environment have been and 
continue to be a key part of the work of the international development community, albeit in 
circumstances where vested interests mean that change can often be challenging to 
achieve. This challenge seems to mean that donors are ‘picking their battles’, working on 
issues where they feel they have some degree of leverage with the country authorities, and 
where change will deliver visible and meaningful impact. In Egypt, for example, the 
international community has been working on regulations to make setting up, investing in, 
and closing down businesses more straightforward. As well as a new bankruptcy law, other 
developments include a new investment law (of which one interviewee observed, ‘it’s not 
perfect, but certainly a step in the right direction’), and work to make it easier for companies 
to formalise. In Lebanon, too, the international community is working where it can to improve 
the business environment. Recently, the parliament passed a budget – the first time in 12 
years that this has happened – and, even though, in the words of one interviewee, ‘there is 
still a marked lack of detail, it does provide a bit more transparency’.  
In Myanmar, despite the desperate need for reform of a dysfunctional banking system and 
early optimism for change, political and economic elites have blocked change, meaning that 
reforms that are ready to go technically have nonetheless been languishing. On the other 
hand, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has had some 
successes in supporting motivated officials within the Financial Regulatory Department on 
micro-finance sector reforms. Their work included providing tools and guidance (e.g. 
evidence, modelling, training, and advocacy support) to motivated officials.  
The WBG Doing Business Index places Sudan in the bottom quintile and shows that the 
pace of business regulation reforms has remained limited in recent years. Sudan’s score 
indicates there is significant room to improve the efficiency and quality of business 
regulations, particularly ones that impact SMEs. Over the past decade, Sudan has been 
slower than most of its peers in the sub-Saharan Africa region in reforming the business 
environment. Nevertheless, progress has been made with international support. For 
example, a private credit bureau was established in 2013. Two years earlier corporate 
income and capital gains tax rates were reduced and labour tax abolished. It also became 
easier to file customs declarations online. Although Sudan outperforms neighbouring 
economies such as Chad and the Central African Republic, however, the pace of reform is 
insufficient to close the gap with most African economies. Across Africa, governments that 
made significant and sustained progress in business environment reforms have tended to 
have vision and support from high levels of the government and a comprehensive approach 
to the reform agenda, including oversight committees to coordinate and maintain 
momentum. As the Government of Sudan is considering embarking on a comprehensive 
reform agenda, moves are afoot to establish a high-level oversight committee to facilitate 
effective coordination of efforts among various stakeholder agencies and line ministries as 
well as technical groups incorporating the private sector.  
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6.1.3 Developing a thriving private sector 
All countries need to develop a private sector that employs people, pays salaries and taxes, 
and so facilitates broad-based economic growth. It is clear that the private sectors in the 
countries studied are a long way from being able to do this. However, this chapter has 
identified a number of key steps that might be taken to support this longer-term process. 
The first challenge is to identify points of access. In the countries studied, large areas of 
business are controlled by elite interests. In the short term, little can be done about this as 
these companies will be part of the structures of political control. Much more relevant is to 
identify where opportunities exist to work with companies that do genuinely create incomes 
and jobs for the population as a whole. This may be by looking at new sectors such as tech-
based businesses, or by understanding how to drive investment into areas of the country 
currently being ignored.  
It is also important to be entirely realistic about what reform might be possible. In all the 
countries studied, a great deal of work is needed to reform the business environment and to 
provide a playing field that is level enough to encourage more investment. In principle, 
addressing these issues should be a priority; however, in practice it may be that large areas 
of reform will be off-limits because of a perception that they might undermine elite interests. 
Nevertheless, by working with business organisations it should be possible to identify a key 
set of reform issues that would lead to economic benefits that form a clear win for the host 
government.  
Finally, underpinning both of the points above is the need to understand where, even in the 
absence of a widespread willingness to reform, it is possible to leverage the support of 
government and others to push forward on specific areas of change. In Egypt, for example, 
the government knew that it needed to be able to demonstrate progress on key reform areas 
to keep international funders happy. Conversely, by pushing too hard on independence for 
the Central Bank in Myanmar, international pressure backfired in terms of implementing 
reforms. Development actors need to have a very clear picture of where leverage exists and 
where change, even if limited, is possible. 
6.1.4 Support direct to the private sector 
The challenge of getting change to happen at macro-political and policy levels means that a 
good deal of development work is focusing on the private sector itself. This takes numerous 
forms. First, there is a focus on ‘new’ sectors. In some of the countries studied, ‘traditional’ 
sectors such as utilities, construction, and communication are under the aegis of elite 
groups. As a result, donors are working in new, innovative sectors such as IT and 
technology. In Egypt, for example, DFID, the IFC, and others support tech hubs such as Flat 
6 Labs, which is an incubator for companies working to develop online products. The aim of 
the Lab is to develop companies to the point where they can access venture capital or 
private equity funding. Second, donors are focusing on developing funding streams for 
SMEs, often using approaches rather different from the standard challenge fund or micro-
finance models that might be used elsewhere. In Lebanon, for example, donors support 
Kafalat, a local company that assists SMEs to access commercial bank funding. In its own 
words, Kafalat helps SMEs by ‘providing loan guarantees based on business plans and 
feasibility studies that show the viability of the proposed business activity’.22 Its processes 
                                               
22 See http://kafalat.com.lb/about-us (accessed 14 June 2018). 
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guarantee applications for loans that are to be provided by Lebanese banks to SMEs 
operating throughout Lebanon. 
In Ethiopia, the government’s industrialisation policy, creation of industrial parks, and use of 
incentives to attract foreign investment are impressive, coupled as they are with attention to 
labour and environmental standards, job creation, and definition of a niche for Ethiopia 
compared to other emerging economies that could help establish foreign investment over the 
longer term rather than encouraging short-term enterprises. However, in order to capitalise 
on this, ensure sustainability, and foster inclusive growth, support to agricultural value chains 
is needed to supply the market, reduce reliance on imports, and revive economic activities 
more widely. Some NGOs and multilateral entities were supporting this but not at the scale 
required. In Sudan, by contrast, there was consensus that agriculture is where the country’s 
economic potential lies and key private sector entities were attempting to garner government 
support. In some cases, Sudanese businesses were themselves seeking to nurture value 
chains and make connections between big business and small enterprises, for example 
through contract farming. However, the top-level leadership is lacking. Greater support is 
needed for these good business practices where the private sector themselves hold a vision 
for broader development. 
In both Sudan and Ethiopia, there was evidence that newer industries stood greater chances 
of thriving as they pose less competition to established players and rely on specific 
knowledge that cannot be easily replicated Donor support to entrepreneurship in technology 
and creative industries is a viable strategy, particularly with a focus on youth who are often 
highly qualified but without job opportunities. With formal job opportunities not matching 
entrance to the job market, an increase in the proportion of educated youth, and decline in 
attractiveness of the public sector, support to entrepreneurship is essential in creating the 
next generation of businesses. 
6.2 Roles 
However, what is also clear from this study is not just what tasks need to be undertaken but 
how different organisations need to work together to achieve them. DFID and agencies like it 
are not working alone; they need to coordinate their activities with a wider range of entities.  
6.2.1 ‘Patient capital’ and private equity 
It is important to collaborate with other development actors – be those other donor agencies, 
investors, local companies, or others. Countries facing the challenges of middle-income 
status and struggling with conflict issues are inherently risky, and seen by potential investors 
as such. It was notable that more than one foreign embassy in Beirut observed how 
challenging companies found the operating environment there. Patient capital instruments, 
and institutions such as the UK’s CDC and PIDG, could be used to act as a bridge away 
from Official Development Assistance (ODA)-based programming toward more fully fledged 
private sector engagement by de-risking investments and demonstrating that successful 
business is possible.  
In both Myanmar and Nepal, the large domestic conglomerates are in cosy relationships with 
government officials and have ready access to sources of finance, while the majority of 
SMEs have little access to finance for investment or working capital. Both countries have 
seen an influx of new forms of private equity and growth capital. At the lower end are SME 
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accelerator funds like Business Oxygen in Nepal and Rockstart, active in both Nepal and 
Myanmar, which supports SMEs to access funds in the range of $100,000 to $500,000 from 
impact investors, alongside management support. At the other extreme are impact funds 
such as Dolma Impact Fund in Nepal or the Insitor Impact Asia Fund in Myanmar (which 
includes some funding from CDC), which make equity investments in early and growth stage 
companies of up to $4 million. In the case of Insitor, the focus is on companies that deliver 
products and services that can improve the living standards of low-income populations in 
areas such as water, food, shelter, education, healthcare, energy, and finance. These funds 
all tend to apply some form of environmental, social, and governance criteria to their 
investments, as well as seeking a social impact alongside financial returns. Conflict analysis 
is not part of the screening, although the funds would argue that their investments do not 
tend to fall in conflict-affected parts of the country. In both countries, several interviewees 
expressed scepticism regarding grant-based funding models (e.g. challenge funds), which 
they perceive as either having little impact or as distorting the market. That said, these 
impact funds are relatively new and the development impacts of investments made so far, or 
their relationship to conflict dynamics, have yet to be adequately assessed.  
6.2.2 South–south collaboration 
It is important to acknowledge the very different approaches to engagement taken by 
different international actors, the significant impacts these have, and the need, therefore, to 
foster better working relationships between traditional donors and newer powers in 
development. Most notably, China has a significant presence and impact in all countries 
under study both as a donor and lender and as an investor. In contexts where relationships 
between western governments and the host government have been tense, and in the case 
of Sudan with formal sanctions, non-western donors may have closer working relationships 
in country. In Ethiopia, it was noted by many informants that the approaches of OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors are focused very much on regulations, 
the promotion of international norms, and ‘soft’ support to improve the operating 
environment, government capacity, and business practice. At the same time, many non-DAC 
donors are present and have close relationships with the Government of Ethiopia – most 
notably China. These actors operate in different ways, often being more operationally 
focused on providing physical infrastructure. It is essential that dialogue between different 
bilateral actors is ongoing to understand how these approaches to developing the private 
sector can be complementary. Similarly, coming out of sanctions in Sudan, most DAC-donor 
bilateral agencies have little PSD programming and weaker relationships with the Sudanese 
government but a legacy of humanitarian response for which there remains enormous need. 
With international support having come primarily from non-DAC donors over the past few 
decades, and increasing economic interests from longstanding partners and new allies such 
as Qatar, Turkey, and Russia, it is essential that both donor programmes and potential 
investment support engagements from different countries take each other’s activities into 
account. DAC donors should consciously seek to build relationships with Middle Eastern and 
Asian aid and trade missions. 
In FCS where government capacity and will to support social outcomes is low, private sector 
actors may take on social functions. In the case of Sudan, a strong culture of social 
responsibility and philanthropy traditionally plays out in charitable giving but for some key 
businesses this is shifting from small and scattergun initiatives toward more strategic social 
engagement and alignment with the SDGs and efforts of international donor agencies. 
Recent efforts to broker discussions between the donor community and Sudanese 
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companies show a promising new model of engagement. With government capacity so low, 
the private sector fills gaps and a small but committed group of socially engaged businesses 
appears to be emerging. Support to bring these business entities together with other actors 
supporting efforts to achieve the SDGs is essential. These private sector companies bring 
broad physical reach across the country, linkages with small business at community levels, 
and experience of designing and implementing ‘social enterprises’ with social impacts at the 
heart of business. They also bring longstanding experience of navigating the politically 
charged context and of getting things done in an extremely difficult and complex 
environment. 
6.2.3 Flexible and adaptive programming 
The complex and sometimes fast-changing context of countries affected by conflict calls for 
a different type of PSD programming, which prioritises flexibility and adaptive management 
over technically driven solutions. For example, the DaNa (‘prosperity’) Facility, funded by 
DFID in Myanmar, is designed as a flexible programme that works across firm, sector, sub-
national, and national government levels and which aims to be able to respond rapidly to 
promising opportunities and requests for assistance.  
While adaptive programming has become something of a mantra that is sensible in theory 
but difficult in practice, Nepal’s Economic Policy Incubator (EPI) programme has been 
singled out as a programme that is genuinely ‘doing development differently’ (Booth, 2018). 
While it is still early in the life of the programme (it started in 2016), EPI has had some ‘early 
wins’ in terms of rapid and significant progress toward improving the investment climate in 
Nepal. These include helping to overcome blockages to a law on special economic zones 
that had previously been held up in parliament for eight years.  
However, what is clear from the countries studied is that the stakes are extremely high. 
However undesirable the status quo might be, alternatives could be very much worse. The 
structure of Lebanese politics is certainly corrupt, and the need to seek consensus means 
that getting things done is slow, if not virtually impossible. Yet however problematic this 
structure might seem to outsiders, it has nevertheless provided stability despite the huge 
pressure exerted by the influx of refugees. One interviewee described Lebanese politics as a 
‘black box’ that defies external analysis while still working. Those planning PSD and other 
donor support need therefore to be very careful in tackling issues that might disturb this 
delicate balance. Indeed, one interviewee observed that a key reason why the Cedre IV 
conference did not apply more conditionality was that the donors did not want to push Prime 
Minister Hariri too hard lest he lost too much face relative to the other power groups in the 
country. 
Development work, therefore, needs to be undertaken on the basis of a clear analysis and 
understanding of the situation a country or particular region faces, and to be aware of the 
importance at least of not making the situation worse. Donors and private investors need to 
recognise that the decisions they make (including the decision to follow the law) are not 
neutral, creating a need to better understand and respond to the views of different groups. 
Of course, ‘do no harm’ can sometimes translate unhelpfully to ‘do nothing’. Economic 
development and poverty reduction remain important, including in conflict-affected regions. 
Given inevitable limits to donor understanding of complex conflict dynamics, adaptive and 
responsive programming that starts with a range of small interventions with real-time 
monitoring to build experience of what works and what is counter-productive again offers a 
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way forward. Working with partners that are trusted by local populations, engaging conflict 
specialists (from within or outside the organisation), and employing local staff are other 
components of good programming. The focus should be on identifying a point of entry at 
which change – even if on a small scale – can be achieved. What was also stressed was the 
need to take small steps with the aim of demonstrating that change need not be detrimental 
to vested interests.  
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7 Conclusions 
This chapter draws together the findings of this report to draw conclusions about the 
challenges faced by fragile, middle-income countries, and how these might be addressed. 
7.1 Regional issues matter 
Countries cannot properly be understood without attention also being paid to the region in 
which they exist. Both in terms of conflict dynamics and the potential for beneficial economic 
linkages, an individual country’s destiny is driven at least to some degree by its neighbours. 
Nepal complains of being ‘India-locked’, and the policies and approach of its huge neighbour 
have significant implications for the economic choices it is able to make. In Lebanon, the 
fragmentation of Syria has closed off one of the country’s main commercial axes to the Gulf 
States. In fragility terms, the Syria crisis has also left Lebanon having to cope with more than 
1 million refugees. However, it is clear that it is not just the reality of regional issues that 
have implications for individual states but also the perceptions to which regional issues give 
rise. In Egypt, for example, the fact that much of the region has descended into conflict 
makes Egyptians very keen to avoid the same fate. As a result, unpalatable though many of 
President Sisi’s policies may be, many of his countrymen are prepared to support him 
because he maintains stability. 
What is clear, therefore, is that PSD and other development programming cannot simply be 
designed just in response to domestic issues but needs to take account of the wider regional 
perspective. This needs to encompass an understanding both of the conflict issues – 
tangible and psychological – and the trading and commercial linkages that may support 
economic growth and development. 
The need for a regional perspective is particularly the case when considering infrastructure. 
The case of the Nile illustrates this point well. Ethiopia’s decision to build a dam has 
significant implications for Egypt, which is already short of water. One country’s 
infrastructure decision can therefore have significant, and often adverse, implications for 
their neighbours. Conversely, well-considered regional infrastructure might actually serve to 
boost commercial opportunities and reduce conflict tensions. Such approaches need to be 
proactively considered in fragile middle-income countries because of the benefits in terms of 
economic potential and conflict-risk reduction. 
7.2 Understanding conflict and fragility tensions is vital 
There is clearly a need for detailed and nuanced understanding of the conflict and fragility 
dynamics in host countries to understand properly where PSD and other programming 
needs to be focused. Sometimes, conflict may not even seem relevant. In Myanmar, for 
example, there are large areas of the country that are stable and therefore in which 
‘business as (more-or-less) usual’ carries on. In a number of the countries studied, the 
apparent source of fragility was not, in reality, the most significant conflict-related issue. In 
Lebanon, certainly the Syrian refugee crisis is a significant cause of tension, and unless 
carefully managed could erupt into violence. However, a more significant potential cause of 
tension would be the disruption of the balance between the different confessional groups in 
the country. 
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There is a need to properly understand the conflict dynamics and to identify the potential 
points of access. As with any conflict analysis, there is a need for a focused question and, in 
the case of PSD professionals, that question relates to the interaction between conflict 
dynamics and the private sector. In what ways does conflict impact on the private sector? In 
what ways do companies and other private sector institutions affect conflict, positively and 
negatively? 
7.3 Everything is linked to everything else 
PSD programming cannot exist in a silo on its own. Many of the issues PSD needs to 
address are themselves subsets of wider issues. Skills challenges in companies reflect wider 
challenges with national education systems; elite interference in the private sector reflects 
problematic governance structures in the country more widely; challenges with the regulatory 
environment are functions of ineffective government structures and a lack of capacity.  
Moreover, in a fragile context, the private sector is inextricably interwoven into the conflict 
dynamics. For example, private sector activities can be used to fund conflict and who 
controls key sectors can reinforce societal divisions; on the other hand, workplaces can also 
bridge sectarian divides. This implies two things. First, PSD practitioners need to maintain 
clear sight of the conflict dynamics in the places in which they operate. Second, those 
working on other areas of development need to focus on the private sector, and to see PSD 
activities as a priority.  
It is important, therefore, that development practitioners are encouraged to understand the 
interrelated nature of their activities in fragile middle-income countries. At a policy level, 
there is now a clear realisation that a failure to focus in FCS early enough on developing a 
thriving private sector actually risks undermining a country’s longer-term stability. As USAID 
(2007: 23) points out, ‘conflict-affected environments often experience large inflows of aid 
assistance early on in the post-conflict phase, which drop sharply as soon as the conflict has 
drifted from public and political attention. Too often, there are no systems or strategies in 
place to build on these initial subsidies to create lasting economic growth’. Therefore, as was 
argued in the 2011 World Development Report, ‘we need to put greater emphasis on early 
projects to create jobs, especially through the private sector’ (World Bank, 2011:xiii). 
Despite this, the evidence from this study is that PSD is still not seen as a priority by some in 
the conflict community. For them, focusing on governance, peacekeeping and then 
peacebuilding, and humanitarian relief are the priorities. It is important that donors (and other 
development actors) reinforce all the time the need to prioritise the development of a diverse 
private sector.  
7.4 Be careful what you wish for 
The international development community has a well-established set of priorities in what it 
seeks to achieve in countries in which it operates. These include free and fair elections, 
transparent institutions, and predicable regulation. These things are seen as de facto and a 
priori public goods that should form the core of development programming in all cases. 
However, what is clear from this study is that in fragile middle-income country environments 
the ‘standard development toolkit’ is not so obviously ‘a good thing’. In Egypt, for example, 
Sisi most certainly is an authoritarian leader. However, the last time ‘the west’ pushed for 
more openness, the result was the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. Is Sisi actually worse 
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than the country falling apart? In Myanmar, attempts to reform the Central Bank went badly 
wrong and led to the stalling of wider reforms. In Lebanon, the confession-based political 
system most certainly stymies reform; however, to tinker with it too much might be to risk 
destabilising a system that, however unlikely, does keep the country from falling apart.  
It also appears to be the case that issues that, in many developing countries are important 
but not urgent, become much more visceral in fragile middle-income countries. Take, for 
example, the issue of the gap between rich and poor, haves and have-nots. This is a 
challenge in most developing countries but one which is neither new nor immediately likely 
to be destabilising. By contrast, in Egypt, the poverty of a large proportion of the population 
is precisely where the risk of long-term instability and potential conflict comes from. In 
Lebanon, evidence from household surveys strongly suggests that what would tip latent 
tension and annoyance over into actual fighting would be limited access to jobs and limited 
opportunities to earn a living.  
This is not, of course, to say that international development priorities are not relevant in 
these countries but rather that the development community needs to recognise that the 
stakes in conflict-affected middle-income countries are extremely high. The fact that a 
country has made it to middle-income status means that at least some of the population lead 
moderately prosperous lives. Mishandling development interventions therefore risks not just 
failing to expand the number of those living in greater comfort but destabilising an often 
complex and opaque system such that those who currently are ‘haves’ become ‘have-nots’. 
The stakes are thus much higher in these environments. If you get it wrong in these 
contexts, the downside is potentially disastrous. 
7.5 Realpolitik 
As well as understanding the conflict dynamics, it is vital for development activities to be 
properly informed by robust political economy analysis. Such analysis will provide clear 
insights into key structures of power, which in turn will help identify the potential points of 
access – where change might be possible on a small front, even if wholesale change is not 
feasible in the short to medium term. However, such analysis will also identify those issues 
that will require donors to accept unpleasant truths. In Lebanon, Myanmar, and Nepal, the 
corruption in and links between politicians and the private sector is endemic. It also, from a 
development perspective, has serious impacts on the country’s population. For example, in 
the power sector kick-backs and vested interests mean that many Lebanese have unreliable 
energy supplies. In Nepal, the business houses resist reforms that would open key sectors 
to competition and development. In the power sector, for example, this means that of an 
estimated hydropower capacity of around 80,000 MW of electricity, out of which 43,000 are 
currently feasible, only 972 MW is currently installed (Office of the Investment Board, 2018). 
However, to seek to address these vested interests without understanding the context risks 
damaging a political fabric that, however problematic it might be, does maintain peace and 
security. 
7.6 The importance of ‘worked examples’ 
As is clear from this study, then, in fragile middle-income countries there are so many issues 
and complications that effecting meaningful change often seems impossible. The 
environment can seem so hostile that it would be easy to give way to a counsel of despair. 
Yet the experience of many of those interviewed for this study is that, however significant the 
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obstacles, change can still happen. In Egypt, despite government scepticism about the 
private sector, donors have been able to find enough common ground to make meaningful 
change on key issues of business environment reform such as the introduction of sensible 
bankruptcy processes.  
There are a number of facets involved in addressing this challenge. The first appears to be 
to choose an issue that is manageable and tangible. Even if change is effected on an 
apparently small front, it can demonstrate both that change is possible and how change 
might actually happen in other places and on other issues. Second, it seems important to 
choose an issue where there is some support among some of the political elite – they can 
see that change needs to happen even if they may not relish that fact. If those who have an 
interest in a status quo ex ante can see that they can also have an (albeit different) interest 
in a new status quo, they are likely to be supportive of further change down the line. The aim 
therefore should be to focus on what is possible, rather than seek to effect grand change 
that will not happen. ‘Worked examples’ of change occurring can be used both to encourage 
and to inform others and to win support within elites that change can be good and beneficial.  
7.7 Diagnostic questions  
Following from the above, what questions might a PSD practitioner usefully ask to develop 
relevant and appropriate interventions? Self-evidently, each fragile middle-income country 
will be different and therefore the policies and interventions to be pursued will also need to 
be different. The following is an indicative list of questions to help policymakers to create a 
set of activities appropriate for their location. 
Regional context: 
 Regional impacts: In what ways, economically and in terms of stability, has the country 
been directly affected by regional factors? 
 Political and physical infrastructure: What regional tensions and infrastructure plans 
exist or are rumoured and how might these impact on the host country? 
 Understanding perceptions: Irrespective of the actual impacts that regional issues 
have had on the country, what perceptions and fears exist stemming from those regional 
factors? 
Country context: 
 Conflict and fragility analysis: What exactly are the different conflict and fragility 
dynamics, recognising that these may differ between different areas of the country? 
 Political economy: Where does power lie and how do networks of power and influence 
operate in practice? What is the relationship with the private sector? 
 Gauging options for change: Given the fragility and political situation, what is the 
appetite and potential for change? How far can things be shifted without undermining 
stability? 
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Private sector: 
 Political interference: How far can the private sector operate free from adverse political 
interference from those in power and their associates?  
 Private sector structure: How is the private sector structured in terms of geographic 
focus, sector spread, and company size? What implications does this have for creating 
income and jobs? 
 Establish points of access: What are likely to be the most positive points of access to 
effect change that will be developmentally valuable? 
PSD: Tasks and roles: 
 Focus on core issues: What PSD interventions will best address the critical success 
factors, the failure to achieve of which entails most risk to the country’s continued 
progression from poverty?  
 Joined-up approaches: How can PSD programming be best joined up with other 
streams of activity not just within the development sphere but also with private and other 
relevant actors? 
 Focus on what is doable: Given the challenges that exist, what is possible and doable 
that can demonstrate the benefit of change but which does not adversely upset the 
status quo?  
7.8 Concluding remarks: Fragility means just that  
The question is sometimes raised as to whether FCS are materially different from other 
developing countries. Are they not the same as others, just more so? This study has 
demonstrated that FCS do look and feel very different, and that this has clear implications for 
development programming in general and PSD programming in particular. 
Such places suffer from elite capture, which affects both political governance and 
transparency in the private sector. Consequently, the rule of law is weak and the regulatory 
environment in which companies operate is challenging. The private sector is often skewed, 
with a small number of (often elite-controlled) large companies and a large number of small 
ones. Mid-size companies that would connect these groups together and create broad-
based economic development are absent. There is also a need to see PSD as an element of 
a wider development approach, not as a set of activities in itself, and to collaborate with a 
wider set of partners. 
The research has demonstrated that fragile and conflict-affected environments pose very 
particular challenges to the development community. First, it is clear that the regional 
dynamic is extremely important. From both the perspective of economic growth and from the 
actual or potential effects of regional conflicts on the domestic environment, it is clear that 
development programming needs to take account of the regional as well as the national 
dimension. Second, there is a need to understand precisely what the conflict issues are. As 
is evident from a number of countries in this study, the ostensible reason for that country’s 
inclusion in a list of FCS states was not, in fact, the main fragility challenge. Excellent 
political economy analysis should be (but, regrettably, often is not) central to all development 
programming. It is clear that equally first-rate conflict analysis is also needed. Third, it is not 
just the actual impacts of conflict that need to be taken into account, so too must be the 
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psychological impacts. Instability has effects on the way people in a country think, and this in 
turn informs what they see as acceptable in their government’s policies. These less tangible 
impacts also need to be taken into account in creating informed interventions. Fourth, and 
most importantly, the presence of instability means that the stakes, on all development 
decisions, are much higher. Situations that may appear to development specialists as 
undesirable – the too-close links between key politicians and large companies, for example – 
are often facets of a skein of overlapping networks that, however bizarrely, maintain stability. 
Even when addressing issues like this seems desirable, development interventions need to 
ensure that they do not inadvertently destabilise such networks. In most development 
situations, a badly designed programme risks only a poor annual review: in fragile contexts, 
however, a badly designed programme risks open conflict and war.  
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